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Hard cases do not always make bad law. Sometimes, when confronted
with records that will yield neither to the direct application of established
legal principles nor to factual manipulation, courts articulate, or at least
suggest, a new principle which should and often does refine a body of old
law. The Supreme Court's decision in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co." should become a prominent and salutary example of such hard cases.
Before Claiborne Hardware, the Court had indicated that legislatures, for
rational economic policy reasons, could make peaceful consumer boycotts
illegal.' Confronted with compelling facts in the Claiborne Hardware
case, however, the Court asserted a new consumer right to engage in con-
certed refusals to patronize even if such refusals are economically disrup-
tive.3 This assertion, while necessary to the Court's decision, did not rest
squarely on any First Amendment or other precedent. This Article will
t- Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. A.B., J.D., Harvard University. I wish to thank
Daniel G. MacLeod, Henry P. Monaghan, Steven H. Shiffrin, and Aviam Soifer for their instructive
criticisms of an earlier draft of this essay.
1. 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
2. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980); Hughes v.
Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). The Supreme Court's Claiborne Hardware decision was
presaged by several Fifth Circuit decisions. See Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 302-04 (5th
Cir. 1979) (extending First Amendment protection to picketing urging participation in civil rights
boycotts), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969)
(same); Kelley v. Page, 335 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1964) (same).
3. Claiborne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3426-27.
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argue that a consumer right to boycott is nonetheless appropriate for our
society, a right in accord with our social and constitutional values. Fur-
ther, the Article will argue that this right should be cast as a broad politi-
cal right to influence social decisionmaking. Finally, the Article will ex-
plore the implications of the right for certain important labor law
doctrines.
4
I. A CONTROVERTIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BOYCOTT
A. The Hard Case of Claiborne Hardware
Delivered on the last day of the Court's 1981 Term, Claiborne Hard-
ware involved a consumer boycott of the white merchants of Claiborne
County, Mississippi, intended to compel them to support demands for ra-
cial justice presented to county officials. The Mississippi Supreme Court
had held the entire boycott tortious and enjoinable since some of the
boycotters had purportedly used "force, violence, and threats" against
other consumers.5 The United States Supreme Court unanimously re-
versed the Mississippi Supreme Court, stressing that the record showed
only "isolated acts of violence." Justice Stevens' opinion concluded that
liability could be imposed only on those boycotters who actually engaged
in violence or in threatening violence, that any monetary liability must be
limited to the direct consequences of such violence or threats, and that
only the continuation of violence and threats could be enjoined.7
The Claiborne boycotters presented an appealing case. The boycotters
were attacking historical injustices by demanding that county government
officials desegregate public schools and other public facilities, make public
improvements in black residential areas comparable to those in white
areas, select blacks for public institutions such as the police force and jury
panels, and generally ensure that officials grant black citizens equal re-
spect and dignity.8 Moreover, the Mississippi Supreme Court had upheld
an obviously onerous judgment of $1.2 million against dozens of individ-
4. Cf. H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-6 (1966) (discussing how hard
cases involving race relations have had salubrious effect on our law).
5. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290, 1301 (Miss. 1980). A Chancery Court
had found that the boycotters not only committed the Mississippi common law tort of malicious inter-
ference with business, but also violated Mississippi's statutory prohibitions on secondary boycotts and
restraining competition. Claiborne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3414-15. The Mississippi Supreme
Court, however, found both of these statutes inapplicable and relied primarily on the common law
cause of action in tort. 393 So. 2d at 1300-02.
6. Claiborne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3432.
7. Id. at 3432-37 & n.67. Justice Stevens wrote for seven Justices. Justice Rehnquist concurred
in the judgment without opinion. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case. Id. at 3437.
8. See id. at 3418-19.
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ual boycotters and against the NAACP, whose Mississippi field secretary
had been the boycott's leading organizer."
In addition, as part of their campaign, the boycotters used many forms
of expression that the Court had earlier found to constitute constitution-
ally protected "speech." For instance, leaders urged others to join the boy-
cott through public advocacy and personal solicitations, and they used
written and oral statements to publicize the names of non-participants.10
Protestors peacefully picketed targeted businesses."1 The Mississippi judi-
ciary not only had imposed liability on individuals for engaging in this
expressive conduct, but also had enjoined its continuation. 2
Claiborne Hardware, however, did more than merely apply the Su-
preme Court's forty-year-old declaration in Milk Wagon Drivers Union,
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc."3 that "insubstantial findings" of
"trivial rough incident[s]" or "moment[s] of animal exuberance" do not
invalidate generally peaceful picketing.14 The First Amendment does not
protect peaceful picketing, speeches at public forums, personal solicita-
tions, or newspaper publications when these means are used to coerce,
incite, or urge others to take part in a real and ongoing illegal venture.' 5
The Mississippi Supreme Court broadened this latter line of cases by de-
claring illegal not only the violence associated with the boycott but also
9. Id. at 3415-16; Delegates at the NAACP Convention Celebrate Boycott Decision, N.Y. Times,
July 3, 1982, at A7, col. 2.
10. Claiborne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3423-24.
11. Id. For cases extending constitutional protection to picketing, see Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl,
315 U.S. 769 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940).
12. 393 So. 2d at 1293.
13. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
14. Id. at 293.
15. The leading case now seems to be Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), in which the
Court struck down an Ohio criminal syndicalism law because it was not limited to expression "di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and "likely to incite or produce such action."
Id. at 447. In one set of applications of this doctrine, the Court has upheld various restrictions on
otherwise protected expression used to advance an unlawful scheme. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Prof.
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (permitting restrictions on otherwise protected expres-
sion when used to advance monopolists' restraint on trade); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Truck-
ing Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (same); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (same); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982) ("[I]t is speech proposing an illegal transaction, which a government
may regulate or ban entirely."); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) ("We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to
publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes."); Building Serv. Employees
Int'l Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (permitting restraints on picketing that urged
illegal employee boycotts); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (finding
no abridgment of freedom of speech or press in making conduct illegal "merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language").
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the entire concerted refusal to purchase that the allegedly protected speech
urged or incited."6
If the United States Supreme Court was to strike down the Mississippi
court's broad injunction of the entire boycott and its broad damage remedy
for all the boycott's economic consequences, it therefore had to find that
Mississippi could not have constitutionally prohibited the Claiborne
County boycott had it been completely peaceful. 17 The Court nonetheless
took this necessary step. After recognizing that a "nonviolent and totally
voluntary boycott may have a disruptive effect on local economic condi-
tions" and that "[s]tates have broad power to regulate economic activity,"
the Court nonetheless denied Mississippi any right to prohibit "peaceful
political activity such as that found in the boycott in this case" and as-
serted that any right of the state "to regulate economic activity could not
16. 393 So. 2d at 1301. Other state courts have declared unlawful efforts to organize peaceful
consumer civil rights boycotts. E.g., NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963) (upholding injunction of boycott intended to attack employment discrimination), vacated
on other grounds, 376 U.S. 190 (1964); A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y.S.
946 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (granting injunction of picketing intended to provoke boycott of store because of
employment discrimination).
A Note on the Mississippi Supreme Court decision in Claiborne Hardware argues that the First
Amendment should protect the publicization of political boycotts, but not the actual concerted refusals
to patronize that the publicity encourages. Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment,
91 HARV. L. REV. 659, 679-91 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Political Boycott Activity]. This
Notes willingness to permit the state to make the boycott illegal, but not the speech which incites it,
seems to stem from its curious assumption that speech which is both intended and likely to generate
lawless action loses its First Amendment protection only when its "target will be forced to violate a
valid law." Id. at 680 (emphasis supplied). However, the Supreme Court's willingness to permit
restrictions on speech used to advance illegal courses of action has not been limited to speech that
forces, rather than merely urges, someone to break a law. See supra note 15 and cases cited therein;
see also Note, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1131, 1162 (1980)
(stressing that expressive activities are not protected when an integral part of illegal boycott) [herein-
after cited as Note, Protest Boycotts]. Perhaps the Harvard Note assumes that the state can properly
make illegal only formal agreements between consumers to refuse to patronize, not informal individ-
ual decisions to join a boycott. See Note, Political Boycott Activity, supra, at 683. But the Note offers
no reason for the protection of individual decisions to join a boycott, unless it is the expressive content
of an individual's refusal. For discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of state regulation of
expressive conduct, see infra pp. 413-15.
17. The Mississippi Supreme Court's finding that the boycott as a whole was tortious did seem to
depend on the Chancery Court's findings of violence. 393 So. 2d at 1301. But a state with authority to
declare illegal a totally peaceful boycott could certainly declare unlawful one that was spotted with
isolated acts of violence.
If the Court had accepted Mississippi's power to declare illegal peaceful consumer boycotts that are
disruptive of trade, the Court could not have protected individual boycotters by citing their rights to
associate in political organizations. A state can punish or restrain association with an organization if
the organization possesses "unlawful aims and goals" and the individual has "a specific intent to
further those illegal aims." Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972); see also Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11, 16 (1966) (membership must be accompanied by specific intent to further unlawful aims
of organization before a statute can attach any disabilities to such membership); Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (statute constitutional because it only punishes membership with
specific intent to accomplish aims of organization by resort to violence). If Mississippi could have
declared the entire Claiborne boycott illegal, these standards would have been met for each individual
who participated in and intended to advance the boycott.
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justify a complete prohibition against a non-violent, politically motivated
boycott." 1 8
B. Difficulties in Deriving the Right
The Claiborne Hardware Court denied states the right to prohibit cer-
tain boycotts and thus upheld the right of an individual to agree not to
patronize a business. Although this outcome has both a superficial appeal
based on the facts of Claiborne Hardware and a more profound appeal
discussed below, a right to boycott is difficult to place in any of the lines of
First Amendment precedent the Court has developed in this century.
1. The Right To Boycott as a Right To Engage in Expressive Conduct
Courts cannot derive a right to join with others in a decision to boycott
from precedents that protect a broad range of conduct expressing to the
world some view held by the actor.19 It is, of course, true that a refusal to
patronize a business expresses an important social view of the boycotter,
especially when the boycott inconveniences the boycotter as well as the
target. The Claiborne County boycotters, for example, sacrificed some of
their normal economic preferences to express their unhappiness with the
division of power and public services in the county. In United States v.
O'Brien,2 0 however, the Supreme Court held that a government may reg-
ulate or even suppress expressive conduct if the governmental interest is
substantial and unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and if the
restriction on that protected expression is no greater than is necessary to
further the government's interest in regulation. 1 The O'Brien standard
18. Claiborne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3425-26. The Court had no difficulty in finding "state
action" under the Fourteenth Amendment in the application of state rules of law by the Mississippi
courts, even though this was a suit between private parties. 102 S. Ct. at 3427 n.51 (citing New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). But cf. Flagg Bros., Inc v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (no
state action where warehouse's sale of entrusted goods was permitted, but not compelled, by state
statutory provision).
19. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (displaying flag upside down with at-
tached peace symbol is form of protected expression); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing black armband in protest of American foreign policy is
protected expression).
20. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien is a leading decision that was cited by Justice Stevens in Clai-
borne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3425.
21. "[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified . . . if it furthers an important or substan-
tial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest." 391 U.S. at 377. Other decisions have applied a standard
close to that of O'Brien. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412-14 & n.8 (1974) (approv-
ing O'Brien, but finding no governmental interest unrelated to expression involved in case); Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-20 (1972) (upholding city ordinance restricting noises around
school). O'Brien was not without precedent. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (city
ordinance can restrict "loud and raucous" sound trucks on public streets); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939) (applying less restrictive alternative test to constraints on distribution of handbills, though
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recognizes that unless all other rights are to be drastically subordinated to
expression, the state must have authority to regulate expressive conduct
when the regulation protects countervailing rights and is not directed at
the content of the expression.2
The O'Brien standard seems to validate most restrictions on organized
refusals to patronize. As Justice Stevens acknowledged in Claiborne
Hardware, state as well as federal governments have a legitimate interest
in averting disruption of their economies. 8 Moreover, this interest is not
related to the suppression of the boycotters' expression; the economic dis-
ruption of Claiborne County, for instance, would have been as great had
the purpose of the boycott not been announced.
In addition, governments wishing to suppress consumer boycotts can
meet the elastic O'Brien requirement that the incidental restriction on
protected expression be no greater than necessary. O'Brien itself upheld a
conviction for a draft card burning against the defense that it was an act
of protest protected by the First Amendment. Having found a substantial
governmental administrative interest in the preservation of draft cards that
was unrelated to the suppression of O'Brien's expression, the Court
seemed unwilling to make the "no greater than is essential" '24 test any-
thing more than a screen of superfluous restraints.
It seems especially probable that restrictions on boycotts would meet the
O'Brien standard. The Court's application of the standard reflects an im-
plicit bias against less traditional forms of expressive conduct and in favor
of traditional ones, such as speaking from a public podium and distribut-
ing handbills. 5 If so, one would expect the Court to permit restrictions on
organized refusals to patronize a business without demanding that a gov-
ernment incur the additional costs of less restriction alternatives. More-
over, even if the Court were as solicitous of boycotts as it has been of
finding that a less restrictive alternative did exist).
22. This should generally be true for all protected speech, because all communication is conveyed
by conduct, whether it be walking into a public place and opening one's mouth or walking around
distributing hand-drafted pamphlets. I therefore agree with those who have argued that the distinc-
tions drawn by some Justices, e.g., Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769,
776-77 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring), and commentators, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEIoM OF EXPRESSiON 80, 444-49 (1970), between speech and speech-plus and between action
and expression have probably been more confusing than enlightening. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A
Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L.
REv. 1482, 1494-96 (1975); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 1, 23. The distinction between action and expression seems to state a conclusion rather than
to assist in analysis. See T. EMERSON, supra, at 448 (attempting to distinguish labor from non-labor
picketing).
23. 102 S. Ct. at 3425.
24. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
25. Ely, supra note 22, at 1488-89. Ely also suggested that O'Brien's act might have been re-
stricted with minimal state justification because it was precisely the illegality of draft card burning
that made it an especially effective means of expression. Id. at 1489-90 & n.29. Accord L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSrrrtmIONAL LAw § 12-20, at 686 (1978).
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handbills, it would be difficult to suggest any means, apart from some sort
of inordinately expensive governmental subsidy to disrupted businesses, to
avoid the economic dislocation of a successful boycott. 6 The Claiborne
boycotters, in contrast, could have communicated their views concerning
racial injustice in their county in many less disruptive ways, such as peti-
tions and marches.
2 7
2. The Right To Boycott as a Right of Autonomy
One might characterize the right to boycott as a right to self-
determination based on privacy or autonomy. Individuals frequently de-
fine themselves through the choices they exercise,28 and, given the nature
of our society, few sets of decisions may do more to define us to ourselves
and to each other than our disposition of consumer dollars. A refusal to
buy non-union lettuce may help define a consumer to himself and to
others who are aware of his motivation. Restricting such decisions would
detract significantly from a consumer's capability to define himself and
would thus diminish his freedom; it would be akin to forcing school chil-
dren to salute the flag,29 or requiring motorists to display a state's ideolog-
ical slogan on their license plates.30 Furthermore, the ability to associate
one's decisions with those of others substantially increases the capacity to
control one's identity, just as it increases the capacity for political and
social expression. A refusal to buy non-union lettuce gains significance as
self-definition, as well as expression, when that decision is associated with
the decisions of others.
Like freedom of self-expression, however, freedom of self-definition
does not provide an adequate basis for a right to engage in a concerted
refusal to patronize. A state could still legitimately attempt to avert the
incidental economic consequences of concerted refusals grounded in a free-
dom of self-definition. Just as most human actions can be expressive, so
26. In any event, boycotters surely cannot argue that their expressive conduct should be given the
special protection granted to speech in public forums. When such forums are restricted, such an argu-
ment prevents governments from citing the availability of alternative forums as justification. See
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 98-99 (1972). However, the Court's special protection of such speech is based in part on the
absence of any strong state interest in regulation of fora such as public streets and parks, except for
time, place, and manner restrictions.
27. Some commentators, assuming that consumer boycotts can only claim protection as expressive
conduct, have argued that antitrust laws may establish rights for businessmen to be free of concerted
consumer actions, including consumer boycotts that affect competition. See Kennedy, Political Boycotts,
The Sherman Act, and the First Amendment: An Accommodation of Competing Interests, 55 S. CAL..
L. REv. 983, 1009 (1982); Note, Protest Boycotts, supra note 16, at 1144-48, 1157-60.
28. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNswrrv-roN. LAW 886-990 (1978) (discussing
rights of privacy and of personhood, including right to autonomy over important life choices).
29. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
30. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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most can be self-defining. In order to protect rights unrelated to the sti-
fling of self-determination, the state must have authority to regulate at
least some conduct that may increase self-determination. A state, for in-
stance, could claim that individual rights to unrestrained commerce are
unrelated to the subordination of self-determination and therefore can
support regulation. By contrast, a state cannot force school children to
salute the flag or prevent motorists from covering ideological slogans on
their license plates because the majoritarian interest in the propagation of
loyalty to government or of some other ideological principle is directly
related to the subordination of self-determination.
3. The Right To Boycott as a Right of Association
A right to boycott also cannot be justified as a right of association under
the First Amendment. The Court, of course, has recognized that the First
Amendment protects the freedom to associate for the purpose of advancing
beliefs. 1 In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,2 the Court held that
requiring monetary contributions to those who advance repellent beliefs
abridges this freedom as much as prohibiting contributions to those who
advance attractive beliefs.38 Therefore, restrictions on consumer boycotts
arguably abridge associational freedoms by impeding consumers' refusals
to contribute money to merchants whose social philosophy they reject."
The Mississippi decision overturned in Claiborne Hardware, for instance,
arguably restricted the freedom of the Claiborne boycotters to choose to
associate exclusively with each other, rather than with those who sup-
ported the discriminatory distribution of public services.
Like recognizing boycotters' rights of expression and self-definition,
however, recognizing their right of association does not invalidate the
state's interest in protecting its economy from disruption. The Court has
never prevented a state from restricting associational freedoms if restric-
tion serves a substantial interest unrelated to the suppression of associa-
tional choices. For instance, while the Abood Court found no significant
state interest in compelling employee contributions to general union politi-
31. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
32. 431 U.S. 209 (1977); see also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961)
(violation of First Amendment to compel railroad employees to pay union dues which then financed
political campaigns); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (reserving judgment
on enforceability of union shop agreement if dues finance ideological concerns).
33. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976) (per curiam)
(freedom of association abridged by prohibition of monetary contribution).
34. The Court has also held that the government cannot coerce citizens into association with any
particular view. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (allowing citizens to disassociate from
political slogan on license plate); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (re-
jecting coerced displays of respect for flag).
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cal causes, the Court did find that the state's interest in its own labor
relations system justified mandatory contributions to the union's collective
bargaining efforts."5
Furthermore, the state can frequently assert the associational freedom
of a boycott's targets as an additional justification for limiting the associa-
tional freedom of boycotters. For instance, the Claiborne boycotters at-
tempted to compel the targeted merchants to associate with the boycotters
and with the cause of racial justice, and to reject their association with the
discriminatory white "establishment."8 The Mississippi court could have
claimed that its decision protected the associational freedom of the white
merchants from private coercion.3 7
C. The Right To Boycott as a Right To Petition the Government
In fact, Justice Stevens' Claiborne Hardware opinion did not justify the
right to boycott in any of the above three ways. Instead, Justice Stevens
argued that the boycott deserved First Amendment protection because the
Claiborne boycotters-through economic disruption-were petitioning the
government for redress of grievances." Justice Stevens placed primary re-
liance on Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.," in which the Court suggested that the "right of the people
...to petition the Government for a redress of grievances"40 shielded the
railroads' campaign for anti-trucking legislation from liability under the
Sherman Act.41 Justice Stevens stressed that the Claiborne County boycot-
ters, like the railroad companies in Noerr, undertook their concerted ac-
tion to produce a response from government. 2 He therefore viewed the
economic effects of the boycott on Claiborne County as a constitutionally
35. Abood, 431 U.S. at 223-32.
36. Even in cases where the boycott targets do not care about the cause of the boycotters, a boycott
can be viewed as obstruction of the target's desire to make associational decisions on independent
grounds.
37. The coercion of the white merchants in Claiborne Hardware might be defended because the
Claiborne County officials probably would not identify the merchants with any views that the boycot-
ters forced the merchants to advance. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-88
& n.9 (1980) (distinguishing California constitutional right to public expression on private shopping
center property from governmental coercion in cases like Wooley and Barnette). However, unlike the
Pruneyard owner of private property, who must let other citizens express their own views on his
property, merchants who are coerced into petitioning the government become personal agents for a
political position they do not hold. Moreover, the Pruneyard Court's distinction of Wooley and Bar-
nette does not apply to Abood, because union members forced to support a political cause would be no
more identified with the cause than the Claiborne white merchants would be identified with racial
justice.
38. Claiborne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3426.
39. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41. 365 U.S. at 139.
42. Claiborne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3426.
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protected petition, rather than as a legitimate rationale for the boycott's
suppression.
Justice Stevens' effort to provide constitutional protection to the Clai-
borne Hardware boycott should be seen as the first step in the articulation
of a significant American right. His conception of a boycott as a petition
of the government, unlike the other three rationales discussed above, pro-
tects the right to boycott because of its potential economic effects, not in
spite of them. Thus, Justice Stevens' conception would make boycotts se-
cure against a state's attempt to protect the economy from economic
disruption.
However, neither Noerr nor Claiborne Hardware offers adequate sup-
port for the right. The Noerr Court may have relied on the Constitution
as well as the Sherman Act, but the railroads' publicity campaign was
quite distinct from the Claiborne Hardware boycott. The railroads at-
tempted to influence government officials by means of dearly protected
First Amendment expression, including speeches and publication of docu-
ments explaining the railroads' attacks on the truckers, while consumer
boycotts were unprotected until Claiborne Hardware.43 In fact, the Court
suggested in Noerr that the result would have been different had the
lower court found that the railroads intended to convince the truckers'
customers to stop dealing with the truckers." The Noerr Court further
stressed that a publicity campaign ostensibly directed at government but
actually intended to convince customers not to deal with competitors
would not be immune from the Sherman Act.45 The Claiborne Hardware
Court suggested that the boycotters' case was stronger than the railroads'
because the boycotters sought to "vindicate rights of equality and of free-
dom" rather than to secure the destruction of "legitimate" economic com-
petition.46 But even if lofty motivation intensifies First Amendment
rights,47 cases, like tables, are not on all fours when one leg is shorter and
one longer.
43. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 142.
44. Id. at 142-43. The Claiborne Hardware Court asserted that the railroads in Noerr intended
"to impair the relationships between truckers and their customers." 102 S. Ct. at 3426. But the Noerr
Court itself clearly found that any effect of the railroads' publicity on the truckers' customer relations
was an incidental, albeit welcome, effect of the railroads' attempt to influence the government. 365
U.S. at 143.
45. 365 U.S. at 144.
46. 102 S. Ct. at 3426.
47. This assumption is in fact inconsistent with another holding of the Noerr Court:
The right of the people to inform their representatives in government of their desires with
respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon their
intent in doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on laws in the
hope that they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their
competitors.
365 U.S. at 139; see also cases cited infra note 134.
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Justice Stevens' reliance on Noerr also suggests a troublesome, inherent
limitation on the right to boycott. Noerr arguably affords protection only
to boycotts with a particular purpose: the coercion of third parties to use
their influence to secure the governmental action desired by the boycotters.
Boycotts that aim to secure something directly from boycotted private par-
ties or to secure their influence on other private entities, by contrast, are
not protected because these boycotts are not efforts to petition the
government.
Like many limits on rights that turn on the purpose of those claiming
the rights, this limit could prove difficult to apply."8 For example, would
this right protect boycotters who seek both direct relief from a merchant
and an indirect petition of the government? 9 Claiborne Hardware sug-
gests that it would because the Claiborne County boycotters had also
asked that all the merchants "employ Negro clerks and cashiers." 50 If this
suggestion is accepted, however, most boycotters could escape the limit
suggested by Noerr by claiming to petition the government, even if the
dominant purpose were to secure other demands.
Moreover, if applied effectively, the limitation would ultimately make
the right anomalous. The limitation would have allowed Mississippi
courts to declare the boycott illegal if the boycotters' sole demand had been
that white businesses cease discriminating against blacks in hiring and
commercial dealing. Such a limitation is significant: It would remove pro-
tection from many of the boycotts that the NAACP cited in its briefs as
vitally important to the political history of this country.51 Furthermore, it
would dilute the meaning of the right to boycott and jeopardize present
plans to use black consumer power to extract agreements from businesses
48. Cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 538-40 (1981) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (stressing difficulty of distinguishing commercially motivated speech).
49. Cf Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (advertisers attempted to obtain protection
of commercial speech by adding political message to advertisement).
50. 102 S. Ct. at 3419 (quoting boycotters' petition).
51. In its petition for certiorari, for instance, the NAACP argued:
Boycott campaigns have played an important role in the history of political protest in this
country ever since American colonists refused to buy English-made goods in order to force
repeal of the Stamp and Townshend Acts. Abolitionists refused to buy slave-made goods before
the Civil War. Consumers' Leagues ...urge[d] boycotts of. . . "sweat-shop" industries.
Blacks in Montgomery. . . boycott[ed]. . . that city's [segregated] bus system. Only recently,
church groups have organized a boycott campaign to protest the sponsorship of television pro-
gramming featuring. . . sex or violence.
Appellant's Petition for Certiorari at 12, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409
(1982). From the above list, only the boycott of English-made goods and the boycott of the Montgom-
ery public bus system could reasonably be considered efforts to compel a petition of the government by
the boycotted party.
The Noerr limitation, however, would not have affected NOW's campaign to encourage state legis-
lators to pass the Equal Rights Amendment by boycotting convention sites in states that resisted
passage. See Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
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to expand employment opportunities for blacks52 and to increase the rep-
resentation of blacks in American films.3
The limitation is also discordant with prior judicial and legislative as-
sumptions about boycotts, because it would offer more protection for a
class of "secondary" boycotts than it would for primary boycotts. In order
to limit disputes to the primary parties in conflict, courts and legislatures
often have disfavored secondary boycotts-boycotts directed at coercing ar-
guably neutral parties to support a demand on an ultimate target.
6 '
The most significant problem with viewing the right to boycott as a
right to petition the government is that this conception protects only those
boycotts that infringe on an important associational freedom of their
targets-the freedom to choose which political campaigns or petitions to
join. While the Abood decision protected this associational freedom from
government coercion, the Claiborne Hardware decision seems to expose it
to private coercion. A justification for Claiborne Hardware's broad right
to boycott must illuminate why the right should outweigh not only states'
claims to protect their economies but also states' claims to protect their
citizens' associational freedoms.
Ultimately, therefore, Noerr and the right to petition the government
cannot provide a firm foundation for a right to engage in a concerted re-
fusal to patronize. Yet it is fortunate that the hard case of Claiborne
Hardware forced Justice Stevens and the Court to conceive of an individ-
ual's association with a consumer boycott as a political act that deserves
protection as a right. The right should be elaborated and defined as a
political act, albeit of a somewhat broader type than the Court had in
mind.
II. AN APPROPRIATE RIGHT TO BOYCOTT
Although a right to boycott cannot be directly derived from any First
Amendment precedent, such a right does appeal directly to our constitu-
tional as well as our social values. The analysis below, however, is not
necessarily a claim that the Supreme Court should impose this right. The
analysis advocates a right that our society should view as seriously and
protect as consistently as any First Amendment right. It does not advocate
any particular method for its adoption."
52. See Boston Globe, June 30, 1982, at 17.
53. See Boston Globe, July 1, 1982, at 17.
54. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976) (identifying certain secondary boycott activities
as unfair labor practices); NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980)
(Safeco) (holding union's secondary picketing violated NLRA).
55. Debates on constitutional rights, including this one, need not be burdened and confused from
the outset by disputes over the Supreme Court's authority to develop the meaning of the Constitution.
The right advocated here could become part of our constitutional law in numerous ways other than by
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A. The Boycott as Political Action
Any secure basis for a right to boycott must trump a state's efforts to
protect its economy from disruption. An individual's decision to join a
consumer boycott must be protected precisely because it enables the indi-
vidual to affect the economy, not in spite of such effects.
One justification for such a right comes from microeconomic welfare
theory: Consumers' full sovereignty over their decisions will help create
the particular mix of production and consumption that maximizes welfare
for a given distribution of wealth and income."6 One of this theory's fun-
damental assumptions is that consumers' reasons for preferring a product
should be valued equally.57 Thus, the reason for a consumer's decision not
to purchase, whether a distaste for the social or political practices of the
producer or an inferior product, should be irrelevant. Moreover,
microeconomic welfare theory recognizes the validity of consumption deci-
sions made with reference to the decisions of other consumers. Consumers'
judgments about a product that derive from others' acceptance or rejection
of that product have the same economic importance as independent
preferences.5"
Nevertheless, microeconomic welfare doctrine is not a sufficient source
for the right to engage in a concerted refusal to patronize. First, the doc-
trine rests on challengeable ethical and empirical assumptions." More-
over, the doctrine expresses a utilitarian calculus that must account for
other policy considerations. The state could claim, for instance, that it can
prohibit consumer boycotts resulting in unemployment, bankruptcy, or re-
exercise of the judicial interpretive power utilized in Claiborne Hardware. Most obviously, the right
could be added to the Constitution by amendment. An act of Congress could declare the right pro-
tected against other federal statutes or state laws. A threatened abridgment of the right might also
warrant the declaration of a principle of constitutional common law. See Monaghan, The Supreme
Court, 1974 Tern-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10-11, 44-45
(1975).
56. The theory, as developed by A.C. Pigou, Vilfredo Pareto, and others, is simply and rigorously
presented in Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 47 AM. ECON. REv. 22 (1957).
57. See I. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 16 (9th ed. 1961).
58. Economists have attempted to analyze how interdependent consumer demand can be accom-
modated by neoclassical microeconomic utility and welfare theory. See Libenstein, Band Wagon,
Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183 (1950).
59. Cf C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 76-89 (1977) (discussing limited competence of
markets). One of the most important of the challengeable empirical assumptions is that of free, unre-
strained competition among producers. At least one commentator has argued that organized consumer
boycotts should be restricted by the antitrust laws when they may have anti-competitive effects. Ken-
nedy, supra note 27, at 1009.
Many people would also challenge the theory's philosophical conceptions of the individual and of
individual choice. See, e.g., Gintis, A Radical Analysis of Welfare Economics and Individual Devel-
opment, 86 Q.J. ECON. 572, 576-78 (1972) (employing ideas of Parsons, Veblen, and Marx to argue
that neoclassical theory takes narrow view of individual welfare by focusing only on what an individ-
ual has to the exclusion of what he is and does); Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 769
(arguing that neoclassical welfare economists assume each consumer "is a self-contained, maximizing
unit disconnected from any ongoing human life").
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duction of competition" because the harm caused by such disruptions out-
weighs the short-run maximization of consumer welfare.61
American political and social theory provides a more secure basis for a
right to engage in a concerted refusal to patronize, a right the state could
not sacrifice to such fears of economic disruption. Joining a consumer boy-
cott should be conceived as a constitutionally protected political act by
which individuals can influence their society. Moreover, this conception of
boycotts as protected political acts should not be limited to those aimed at
affecting governmental decisionmaking. Even boycotts aimed solely at pri-
vate decisionmaking should share the status of other political acts such as
electoral voting, contributing money and time to an election or referendum
campaign,62 and litigating for social purposes.63 All of these political ac-
tions can be viewed broadly as means by which citizens can influence im-
portant social decisionmaking."
Concerted refusals to patronize can provide a means to affect decisions
about society even when they are not intended to influence governmental
decisions. Decisions made by targets of boycotts-who is employed, how
they are employed, where capital is allocated, and what is produced-can
be as important to our society and the lives of its members as decisions
made by government officials.65 Furthermore, the impact of a consumer's
vote in the marketplace through a boycott is proportional to dollars with-
held and it is unmediated by representatives sensitive to other interests.
Nor is the impact lost if a majority of consumers do not join the concert; it
is only lessened. Finally, concerted refusals to deal can be utilized by mi-
60. See Kennedy, supra note 27.
61. A utilitarian calculus could recommend a per se rule affirming a right that should not be
overweighed by particular calculations in individual cases. See Brandt, Toward a Credible Form of
Utilitarianism, in CONTEMPORARY UTILrrARIANIsM (M. Bayles ed. 1968). Any rule based on con-
sumer welfare calculations, however, is vulnerable to general calculations of the welfare lost by pro-
duction dislocations or inequities.
62. Cf Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294-300 (1981) (treat-
ing consumer boycott of private landlords as political association); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (per curiam) (First Amendment protects political association).
63. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401
U.S. 576, 585 (1971); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S.
1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
64. Viewing decisions to join boycotts as political acts should appeal to a broad cross-section of the
political spectrum. Conservatives argue that private rights in the marketplace should parallel private
rights in the traditional political forum. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 315-16
(1972); Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods and the Market for
Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 384 (1974). Progressives are interested in expanding the means by which
common citizens can affect decisions that determine the nature of their society. See, e.g., P. BACH-
RACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELrrIsM: A CRIIQUE (1967); M. CARtoy & D. SHEARER,
ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1980's (1980).
65. Cf. C. LINDBLOM, supra note 59, at 170-88, 214-21 (discussing privileged position of busi-
ness and circularity of control in market system); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 429 (1971) (making
similar argument in favor of protection of commercial speech by First Amendment).
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norities who, because of imperfections in our political process, lack an
influence over governmental policy proportionate to their numbers. 6
Of course, those with more dollars at their disposal have more votes in
the economic marketplace, just as they are likely to have more influence
on the campaign trail and in the corridors of state power.6 7 Because of the
potential impact of marginal shifts in consumer spending, however, boy-
cotts by even the economically poor and politically weak need not be inef-
fective. The fact that a consumer boycott, like a lobbying effort, is easier
to organize when a group holds a view with a special intensity is also not
troubling. Registration of the intensity of beliefs in the economic market-
place is no less legitimate than registration of the intensity of beliefs in the
political marketplace."'
Casting the right to engage in concerted refusals to patronize as a right
to attempt to affect social decisions clearly accords with the ends the Su-
preme Court has advanced in securing First Amendment rights. These
ends include providing "participation in decisionmaking by all members of
society" and "achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable com-
munity."6 Although the Court before Claiborne Hardware had not af-
firmed a right to engage in a political act unless it could be viewed as a
petition to government or as participation in the traditional electoral pro-
cess, there are precedents for treating a right to boycott as political action.
The Court has supported the right to engage in some acts, such as con-
certed litigation to challenge social institutions, because some groups have
been unable to assert influence effectively "through the ballot."17 0 More-
over, the leading decision affirming First Amendment protection for com-
mercial advertising stressed that many important decisions in our society
are made through private economic decisions.71 Establishing a right to
66. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
67. The Court, however, has rejected grounding state regulation of campaign financing on the
unequal financing capacity of citizens. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley
v. Valec, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49, 54-57 (1976).
68. Indeed, to explain how a minority group intensely committed to a political view can control
the decision of a democratically selected legislature, some writers have invoked the model of the mar-
ketplace and have pointed out that intensely held preferences of a minority of consumers control
commercial decisions. See A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 55-60 (1957); Pos-
ner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335 (1974).
69. See T. EMERSON, supra note 22, at 7; see also Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedon
of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A L. REv. 964 (1978) (stressing that participation in societal decisionmaking, as
well as individual self-fulfillment, is goal of First Amendment); Redish, The Value of Free Speech,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982) (arguing that fundamental value served by First Amendment is
individual self-realization).
70. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). Button's description of political litigation could
have been invoked in Claiborne Hardware for consumer political boycotts: "In the context of NAACP
objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the
lawful objectives of equality of treatment. . . . Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their
objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts." Id.
71. "[E]ven if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 93: 409, 1984
participate in a concerted refusal to patronize as a right to engage in polit-
ical action would reinforce the best tradition of the development of rights
in this nation-the tradition that, in the words of Professor Ely, has se-
cured rights of process by "Clearing the Channels of Political Change." '
Finally, articulating such a right, and making it analogous to the right to
participate in political campaigns or to litigate for social change, shows
why such a right should protect persons as fully when they act in associa-
tion with others as it does when they act alone.73 The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that effective political action requires organization.7' The
same is true of a refusal to patronize, which can have palpable impact
only in association with others."3
This derivation of the right to boycott, unlike the other possible deriva-
tions, also makes the right secure against claims that the state can prohibit
concerted refusals to patronize to avert economic dislocations or to protect
some asserted individual right to be free of the effects of such concerted
refusals. If citizens have a right to join in a concerted refusal to purchase
a product because the refusal affords them an important means of influ-
encing social decisions through economic pressure, the state cannot pro-
hibit such a refusal when it succeeds in having an economic effect. Accept-
public decisionmaking in a democracy, we should not say that the free flow of [commercial] informa-
tion does not serve that goal." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
72. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT 105 (1980).
73. See Bucdey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (contributing to organization to disseminate
political message is protected because "it enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in fur-
therance of common political goals"); see also Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975) (constitu-
tional freedom to associate for advancement of political beliefs); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
460 (1958) (freedom to associate for advancement of beliefs is protected from direct or indirect sup-
pression); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTIONAL LAW 702 (1978) (although Court has never held
right of association prevents state from making group action illegal without making comparable indi-
vidual action illegal, Court has consistently protected right "to join with others to pursue goals inde-
pendently protected by the First Amendment") (emphasis omitted). Last Term, the Court, in an
opinion quoted by the Claiborne Hardware Court, 102 S. Ct. at 3423, confirmed Professor Tribe's
assertion: "There are, of course, some activities, legal if engaged in by one, yet illegal if performed in
concert with others, but political expression is not one of them." Citizens Against Rent Control v. City
of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981).
74. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
75. De Tocqueville's thoughts on "The Use Which The Americans Make of Public Associations
in Civil Life" are especially apposite:
Among democratic nations, on the contrary, all the citizens are independent and feeble; they
can do hardly anything by themselves, and none of them can oblige his fellow men to lend him
their assistance. They all, therefore, become powerless if they do not learn voluntarily to help
one another ....
. . . The first time I heard in the United States that a hundred thousand men had bound
themselves publicly to abstain from spirituous liquors, it appeared to me more like a joke than
a serious engagement, and I did not at once perceive why these temperate citizens could not
content themselves with drinking water by their own firesides. I at last understood that these
hundred thousand Americans, alarmed by the progress of drunkeness around them, had made
up their minds to patronize temperance.
2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 115, 118 (Bradley ed. 1945).
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ance of a right to boycott as a political act must entail the rejection of a
right to be free of political consumer boycotts.
7 6
The right to engage in consumer boycotts as a political act also neces-
sarily entails the rejection of a right to associate free of coercive consumer
boycotts. Thus decisions like Abood v. Detroit Board of Education77 can-
not justify any state restrictions on consumer boycotts. Unlike the coercive
power of the state, the coercive power of a group of consumers who boy-
cott a supporter of a particular cause or political institution is limited to
the aggregation of those consumers' economic votes.' 8 A claim that a con-
sumer's refusal to patronize is an interdependent decision made because
others are making similar decisions cannot undermine the consumer's
right to make that decision.73 The coercion inherent in political boycotts is
simply an exercise of the influence that citizens as consumers should be
encouraged to exercise.
An analogy to electoral voting is illuminating. By threatening to remove
elected public officials from office, electoral voting may "coerce" those of-
ficials to reject political causes in which they might believe. Yet such "co-
ercion" is an accepted part of governmental decisionmaking. Consumer
"coercion" of businessmen who fill important public roles of significant
political influence should also be acceptable.8"
76. Just as most rights entail correlative duties, so do most rights require the rejection of other
rights. For instance, an individual's right to obtain service at a diner owned by a second individual
perforce entails both the second individual's duty to serve the first individual, and the rejection of a
right of the second individual to refuse service to the first.
77. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Abood actually supports exercise of the right to boycott as a political act
of refusing to support particular political or social positions. The Abood Court did affirm that the
state could require employee contributions to the collective bargaining efforts of the employees' exclu-
sive representatives, 431 U.S. at 223-32, but such a requirement can be justified as a tax to support
the efforts of a majority of employees to protect their interests. Abood holds that the political system
can only tax its members to maintain the system's internal operation and not to attempt to influence
the wider society and polity of which the system is a part. Forcing consumers to support businesses'
political and social practices of which they disapprove cannot be so justified because those businesses
cannot in any way be characterized as the representatives of the consumers in any system insulated
from the general society or polity. See supra p. 420.
78. One arguably important distinction between economic votes and political votes should be ac-
knowledged: A political voter can easily maintain the secrecy of the ballot, while most purchases of
goods and services are made in public stores. Some might argue that this distinction is significant
because public economic voters are more vulnerable to psychological and social coercion than are
private political voters. However, most protected political activity, such as the donation of time and
money to a campaign, is not private. A citizen who is asked by a friend or employer to assist a
candidate or cause may be under great social and even economic pressure. Furthermore, a state could
protect the privacy of economic voters, to an extent, without denying a consumer right to boycott. For
instance, although the Claiborne Hardware Court affirmed the right of the boycotters to publish lists
of black citizens defying the boycott, 102 S. Ct. at 3424, a consumer right to boycott does not necessa-
rily entail a right of totally unrestricted distribution of information on those who refuse to boycott. But
see infra note 112 (arguing that First Amendment allows publication of names of boycott violators).
79. Comparisons with interdependent behavior of businesses proscribed by the antitrust laws, see
Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommerdal Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DuKE L.J. 247,
251, cannot support legal attacks on the consumer right to boycott suggested by Claiborne Hardware.
80. See generally G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE PowER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACv (1966) (ana-
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This argument, of course, is more persuasive when business owners or
managers have voluntarily made themselves part of a decisionmaking elite,
as had some of the boycotted merchants in Claiborne County.81 The argu-
ment is particularly applicable to owners and managers of large corpora-
tions. It is admittedly less applicable to owners or managers of small busi-
nesses who may not have any special potential influence over even a local
government. In my judgment, however, concern about the associational
freedom of boycott targets in even these cases does not warrant compro-
mising the right to boycott. Consumer boycotts have usually targeted busi-
nessmen with special political influence, and this practice seems unlikely
to change. More importantly, to expand popular participation in social
decisionmaking, a democratic society can appropriately deny some citizens
economic protection in order to secure all citizens a right to engage in
consumer political action.
B. Refinement of the Right
It is possible to refine and reasonably limit the right to join in concerted
refusals to purchase once it is cast as a right to influence social decision-
making through economic action. This section suggests several definitional
principles designed to refine the right and to help explore its implications
for labor law.
1. The Right Should Cover Only Consumer, Not Producer, Boycotts
Unlike other conceptions of a right to boycott discussed above, the con-
cept that a decision to join a boycott is a political act analogous to electoral
voting clarifies why a consumer's free choice deserves more protection
than a producer's free choice. Our society should be more concerned about
the coercive impact of business boycotts, or even employee boycotts, than
about the effects of consumer boycotts. Consumer boycotts deserve protec-
tion in our democracy in part because every consumer has roughly the
same economic voting potential.8 When a group of consumers of personal
goods and services exerts leverage over economic, political, or social deci-
sions, other individuals with equally intense feelings can respond roughly
in proportion to their numbers. By contrast, individuals as producers and
owners of capital have specialized and very unequal market power. By
threatening to withhold their services or capital, some individuals can ex-
lyzing importance of private power in American democracy).
81. Many of the Claiborne Hardware merchants also served in important public positions in the
County. See 102 S. Ct. at 3414 n.3.
82. Cf Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (weight of each citizen's vote in choosing legisla-
ture must be roughly equal).
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ert disproportionate leverage over important social decisions. Consumers,
who are not in special economic roles, cannot effectively counter these
threats even though their feelings may be equally intense.
Thus, while the Supreme Court found illegal the longshoremens' re-
fusal to handle cargo destined to or arriving from the Soviet Union follow-
ing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that decision is fully consistent
with Claiborne Hardware."' The longshoremen, by virtue of their special-
ized role in the economy, have a potential influence on American foreign
policy drastically disproportionate to their numbers in our society."
A broad consumer right to boycott is similarly consistent with restric-
tions on refusals by American businesses to deal with a particular foreign
nation, such as Israel, for political reasons.85 Because economic voting by
consumers expands the scope of participatory activity, a democracy should
not restrict such voting-but it can restrict the use of special economic
power that may undermine a foreign policy determined by democratic
processes.8 6
One may invoke Buckley v. Valeo,87 to argue that it is impossible to
protect consumer boycotts without protecting producer boycotts. In Buck-
ley, the Court struck down legislative restrictions on protected political
campaign expenditures even though the legislation was meant to ensure
that other protected activity would not be overwhelmed. 88 Buckley, how-
ever, is inapposite. Although the Supreme Court has found that the First
Amendment does not tolerate governmental efforts to equalize the influ-
ence of individuals in campaigns, governments can and must ensure indi-
vidual equality in voting.8' If boycotts are analogous to electoral voting,90
83. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. 212 (1982); see also Teamsters
Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (employee boycott illegal); Garner v. Teamsters Union
Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) (same); Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen
Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953) (same).
84. This is not to assert that there should be no constitutionally grounded right to strike in some
circumstances; see, e.g., United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 885 (D.D.C.)
(Wright, J., concurring), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971); Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4
VAND. L. REv. 574, 575-81 (1951). But a consumer right to boycott does not, and should not, imply
a commensurate employee right.
85. See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, 539 F. Supp. 1307, 1317-19 (denying corporation's
assertion of First Amendment defense to violation of prohibition on cooperation with Arab boycott of
Israel), reconsid. denied, 544 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Wis. 1982); see also Osborn v. Pennsylvania-
Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553 (D. Del. 1980) (First Amendment does not
prevent relief against gas station retailers' refusal to sell gas in protest of Department of Energy policy
on gas pricing). But see Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.)
(extending First Amendment protection to gas station boycott like that in Osborn), rev'd on other
grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).
86. See supra p. 424. In contrast, conceiving of the right to boycott primarily as a right to expres-
sion, autonomy, association, or petition does not explain why employee or business boycotts deserve
less protection than consumer boycotts.
87. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
88. Id. at 48-49, 54, 56-57.
89. The Buckley Court recognized the distinction between state efforts to equalize political expres-
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governmental efforts to equalize the economic voting power of citizens
should be constitutional. Moreover, in cases dealing with the electronic
media, the Court has held that when individuals or businesses have mo-
nopolistic control over particular powers of expression, the state can regu-
late their expression to an extraordinary extent.91 Therefore, under our
general First Amendment jurisprudence, granting consumers the right to
engage in concerted refusals to purchase need not logically entail granting
businesses comparable rights to refuse to deal or employees comparable
rights to refuse to work.
Distinguishing the citizen as consumer from the citizen as producer
should also clarify which purchasing decisions the right to boycott should
encompass. Private purchasing decisions that we make as consumers of
finished products should be protected; purchasing decisions that we make
as parts of a chain of production should not. All of us make purchases as
final consumers, albeit in different markets and at different price levels.
But only some of us make purchases as part of production, and these are
dictated more by specialized economic roles than by consumption prefer-
ences. For those who labor in latter-day cottage industries for pleasure as
well as remuneration, the line between consumption and production may
not be bright, but it is discernable. The right to boycott should not apply
to the purchase of any good used to support a production effort, even if,
like new factory windows or industrial cleaning fluid, the good never be-
comes a material element of any finally consumed product or is never even
used directly to work on the product. This limit on the right would pre-
sion and state efforts to equalize electoral action:
Cases invalidating governmentally imposed wealth restrictions on the right to vote or file as a
candidate for public office rest on the conclusion that wealth "is not germane to one's ability to
participate intelligently in the electoral process" and is therefore an insufficient basis on which
to restrict a citizen's fundamental right to vote. . . . [V]oting cases and the reapportionment
decisions serve to assure that citizens are accorded an equal right to vote for their representa-
tives regardless of factors of wealth or geography. But the principles that underlie invalidation
of governmentally imposed restrictions on the franchise do not justify governmentally imposed
restrictions on political expression.
Id. at 49 n.55 (citations omitted).
90. See supra p. 425.
91. Compare CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding statutory requirement that grants
federal candidates right of reasonable access to use of airwaves) and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969) (First Amendment allows no monopoly of airwaves by licensees) with
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding unconstitutional "right of
reply" statute granting political candidates equal space to respond to criticisms by newspapers where
newspaper had no formal monopoly of medium). Even newspapers, however, are not immune from
legal restrictions on monopoly: "Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First
Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests. The First Amendment
affords not the slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and
views has any constitutional immunity." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)
(footnote omitted).
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vent a productive enterprise, whether or not it was incorporated or com-
mercial, from ever claiming the right to boycott.
2. The Right Should Encompass Only Boycotts Aimed at Affecting the
Decisionmaking of Targets, Not the Status of Targets
Unlike other possible conceptions of the right to boycott, conceiving of it
as a right to attempt to affect social decisionmaking readily distinguishes
legitimate boycotts from those that refuse to patronize a business because
of the identity of its owners or managers. After the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Thornhill v. Alabama9" granted constitutional protection to some
peaceful picketing-presumably including picketing that advocates a con-
certed refusal to patronize a business-Professor Jaffe worried that pick-
ets would be used to organize boycotts of businesses because of the ethnic
background of their proprietors. 31 The result in Claiborne Hardware,
however, is consistent with laws prohibiting boycotts of businesses because
of the identity of their owners. The right to boycott envisioned in this
Article would not attach to such boycotts, since their ultimate goal is to
inflict harm on particular individuals, rather than to influence social
decisions.
Only a boycott that asks the targeted business to adjust its social deci-
sions deserves protection. Those decisions may include the way the target
exerts its political influence, the products it sells, the employees it hires,
the manner by which it allocates its capital, or the other businesses with
which it deals."4 This conclusion is not trivial, however, because it denies
protection to campaigns intended to direct purchases toward minority-
owned businesses: Such campaigns are indistinguishable from those meant
to divert purchases away from nonminority businesses without offering
these nonminority businesses any alternative. If boycotts of nonminority-
owned businesses are to be protected, therefore, the boycotters must per-
mit the targets to escape the boycott by, for example, conforming to legal
minority hiring policies or adopting minority investment practices.9 5
92. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
93. See Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 MICH. L. REv. 1037,
1053 (1943).
94. A demand by boycotters that the owners of a business give up total or partial ownership to
members of another group might be characterized as an attempt to achieve social change, rather than
as an attack on the business and its owners. This characterization distorts the true nature of the
boycott, however, since the social change being sought is the reduction of the social power of certain
individuals because of their social status, not because of their social decisionmaking.
95. Interestingly, contemporary consumer boycotts organized by the NAACP and other civil rights
groups have demanded that targeted businesses deal with more minority-controlled businesses, but
they have not attempted to direct minority consumer purchasers only to minority-controlled busi-
nesses. See, e.g., Wall St J., July 21, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (discussing campaign of Jesse Jackson and
Operation PUSH to encourage large businesses, such as Coca-Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken, to
allow more black-controlled franchises); N.Y. Times, July 5, 1982, at A19, col. I (discussing similar
429
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This limitation would also restrict a boycott directed at business propri-
etors merely because they hold particular beliefs, rather than because they
make social decisions based on those beliefs. Thus, while the state could
not restrict a campaign against Jaffe's grocery store that stressed only
Jaffe's contribution to the Irish Republican Army, the state could restrict
a campaign that also stressed Jaffe's professed belief in Catholicism or in
an independent Northern Ireland. As the Claiborne Hardware decision
itself suggests, the line between attacking beliefs and attacking social deci-
sions may be difficult to draw, but the state should be able to insist that
any boycott target only particular decisions, not general beliefs.
Because an individual's past is immutable, the state might also restrict
boycotts against business proprietors for past social decisions. Jaffe's
boycotters could not claim that they were attempting to affect his future
social decisionmaking by continuing their boycott after Jaffe had stopped
contributing to the IRA. The boycotters could not convincingly claim that
they were attempting to deter other proprietors from contributing to the
IRA because they could organize new campaigns against offending
proprietors.
3. The Right Should Not Include Boycotts Aimed at
Compelling Illegal Action
The range of social decisionmaking by private businesses that consumer
boycotts may hope to influence suggests a third limit on the right to boy-
cott. At least when the boycott is likely to have economic impact, the deci-
sion that the boycotters hope to compel must not itself be illegal. This
limit should not be controversial. Even political expression loses its protec-
tion when it is both designed and likely to incite lawless action," and
there is no reason to grant consumer boycotts preferred status over tradi-
tional forms of expression. Ineffective boycotts might still be protected as
expressive, self-defining, or associative, regardless of their purpose, but
any effective boycott that compels action illegal under a valid state law*t
should not be permitted.
efforts by NAACP).
A boycott demanding that a targeted business deal with more minority-controlled businesses may
seem indistinguishable from a boycott of a business for not being minority-controlled. See supra note
94. The former boycott, however, offers the targeted businessmen a means of escaping the boycott
without sacrificing ownership of their business. As long as dealing with more minority businesses
would not itself be illegal under anti-discrimination laws, see infra p. 431, a boycott that demands
more dealings with minority businesses should be protected.
96. See supra p. 411.
97. States, of course, should not be able to restrict selected boycotts by passing unconstitutional
laws against particular business practices that boycotters may wish to compel. A state law against
hiring black sales clerks thus would be no defense against a boycott attacking a white store for dis-
criminatory hiring practices. See M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND
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This limit is important for two reasons. First, many boycotts have
sought goals that a state has declared illegal. While the Claiborne County
boycotters demanded little more than "rights guaranteed" by the Four-
teenth Amendment,"8 many other possible aims of boycotts such as quota
hiring of a particular ethnic group or allocation of a minimum number of
franchises to members of that ethnic group," have been or could be de-
clared illegal. Indeed, the Claiborne Hardware Court distinguished
Hughes v. Superior Court,100 which held that California could enjoin
picketing to implement a boycott that demanded a minimum fifty percent
hiring of Negro clerks, because this aim was itself "prohibited by a valid
state law." 10 1 Any such law would force civil rights boycotters to adjust
their demands, perhaps to ask only for non-discriminatory treatment10 2
and some affirmative role in policing the business to ensure such
treatment.
1 03
Second, the state's authority to restrict refusals to deal by businesses
and producers, coupled with the illegal purpose limitation, would permit
the state to declare illegal a consumer boycott demanding that the targeted
business use its special economic power illegally.104 For instance, had the
Hughes boycotters demanded that the retail stores in their community not
deal with manufacturers who discriminated against blacks, California
could have restricted their campaign by declaring illegal both the refusal
of one business to deal with another for such reasons, and also the efforts
of consumers to compel such a refusal.01
JUDICIAL REVIEW 68-69, 146-50 (1966).
98. Claiborne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3426.
99. See Wall St. J., July 21, 1982, p. 1, at col. 6.
100. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
101. Claiborne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3427 n.49. Today, such a demand, unless appropriately
limited, could provoke action illegal under federal law. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 208 (1979).
102. For instance, the pickets in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552
(1938), seem to have made no greater demand. Their placards read only "Do Your Part! Buy Where
You Can Work! No Negroes Employed Here!" Id. at 557.
103. This limitation could restrict a variety of consumer boycotts other than civil rights boycotts.
For instance, the state could prohibit any tenant boycott in support of a demand by housing consum-
ers-tenants-for violation of state housing codes.
104. The authority, however, would not permit the state to declare illegal a consumer boycott, like
that in Claiborne Hardware, which demanded that the targeted business use its special political rather
than its special economic influence, assuming the state could not, or at least did not, render illegal the
business's use of its political influence.
105. This illegal objective limitation would authorize the state to prohibit any consumer boycott
that demands the targeted business cajole an employee to take some action or support a particular
union, so long as the state also prohibits all employer pressure on employees independent of any
consumer boycott. See infra p. 449. The illegal objective limitation, however, should never permit the
state to restrict consumer boycotts, like that in Claiborne Hardware, directed against the social and
political decisionmaking of controlling owners of targeted businesses. The state has no conceivable
interest in making illegal the pressure businesses put on their owners. Consumers should have an
equal right to organize a boycott to protest the owners' political and social decisionmaking outside the
business as well as inside.
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A state should not, however, be able to restrict consumer boycotts hav-
ing legal objectives simply because the states could declare the objectives
illegal.108 Although there is some troublesome language in Justice Frank-
furter's majority opinion in Hughes,'07 the Court has never held that the
state can restrict speech that incites legal action simply because that legal
action is not itself constitutionally protected. The same principle should
apply to consumer boycotts. As argued above, a right to refuse to patron-
ize would promote democratic social decisionmaking. Prohibiting citizens'
attempts to use marketplace votes to influence a more powerful actor's
lawful decision only restricts the democratic power of the less powerful.
Unless the state also makes illegal the decision that the boycotters hope to
compel, a restriction cannot be justified as a prohibition of incitement to
illegal action and stands directly against the democratic values supporting
the right to boycott.
4. The Right Should Not Protect Tactics That the State Can Prohibit
Outside of a Boycott
The Claiborne Hardware case highlights a fourth limitation essential to
any definition of a right to boycott: Tactics illegal outside a boycott should
be illegal within a boycott. Thus, the Claiborne Hardware Court empha-
sized that Mississippi could enjoin violence and threats of violence, and
could impose liability on any boycotter for the damage his threats and
violence caused.' 08 A state should also be able to impose liability for any
speech or expressive conduct in a boycott that would not be protected
outside of a boycott because of its defamatory content 09 or "fighting"
106. But cf. Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amend-
ment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 34-38 (1979) (utilizing logical fallacy that the greater must include the lesser
to support government regulation of commercial advertising).
107. 339 U.S. at 468 (claiming that California could enjoin peaceful picketing because state might
prohibit an employer from adopting a quota system, regardless of whether California had actually
done so). Several Justices seemed to disagree with this claim. See id. at 469 (Black & Minton, JJ.,
concurring); id. (Reed, J., concurring); Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 867, 198 P.2d 885,
895 (1948) (Traynor, J., dissenting). In Teamsters Union Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950),
Justice Frankfurter, for a majority of the Court, seemed to apply the illegal objective doctrine to
prohibit picketing urging consumers to boycott an employer for not performing a legal act-setting up
a union shop. Justice Frankfurter's Hanke analysis is therefore vulnerable to criticism similar to that
directed against his Hughes opinion. See Cox, supra note 84, at 586-91. The result in Hanke can be
squared with a consumer right to boycott, however, because the picketing there was aimed at
employees.
108. 102 S. Ct. at 3426.
109. A defamation action does not generally require proof of the boycotters' reckless disregard of
the truth. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Business boycott targets in most
cases would not qualify as "public figures" or individuals who had voluntarily thrust themselves into
a public controversy. See Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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message likely to provoke listeners to commit acts of violence.110 A state
could also regulate some boycott speech if boycotters made factual misrep-
resentations to potential consumers.11 Perhaps the state might even re-
strict extreme public humiliation of those who refuse to join a boycott,
although Claiborne Hardware seemed to protect the psychologically coer-
cive tactics of the boycotters.112 In any event, courts should not protect
110. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Chaplinsy doctrine has been
narrowly construed by the Court and seems now to apply only when the fighting words are directed
toward particular individuals likely to react violently. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
111. The Court has never held that the state can regulate political speech in the interest of insur-
ing that potential voters are not misled by misrepresentations. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state cannot require newspaper to grant political candidate space to
reply to attack); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (state cannot proscribe all campaign-related
speech on election day). In recent decisions extending First Amendment protection to commercial
speech, however, the Court has said it will not disturb states' power to protect consumers from "false,
deceptive, and misleading" commercial representations. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979); see
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). The reasons for permitting greater government regulation
of commercial advertising include its supposed durability resulting from profitability and the assump-
tion that advertisers have a relatively easy task of verification. See id. at 771 n.24. These rationales
may not apply to speech advocating a political consumer boycott. Yet the danger of government bias
against those who seek economic votes through the use of alleged misrepresentations is much less than
the danger of government bias against those who seek political votes with alleged misrepresentations.
See Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobbying: Defining and Attaining The Public
Policy Objectives, 68 COLum. L. R v. 801, 832 (1968). Therefore, the state should be able to restrict
boycotters from inaccurate statements of fact. However, robust free speech would be sacrificed if a
state could restrict boycotters' expression of their own perceptions, say, of an employer's unfairness to
blacks or unions, because the state's courts view these perceptions to be inaccurate. See State ex rel.
Fair Share Org., Inc. v. Newton Circuit Court, 244 Ind. 112, 191 N.E.2d 1 (1963) (permitting
injunction against picketers claiming that store "discriminates against Negroes" because court did not
agree with picketers' perception).
112. The Court summarized the matter.
[Niames of boycott violators were read aloud at meetings at the First Baptist Church and
published in a local black newspaper. Petitioners admittedly sought to persuade others to join
the boycott through social pressure and the "threat" of social ostracism. Speech does not lose
its protected character, however, simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into
action.
Claiborne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3424.
The argument that the First Amendment should not protect the publication of names of boycott
violators would rest on a contention that these boycotters may have considered their purchasing deci-
sions private. The argument has several weaknesses. First, the Supreme Court has never carved out
an exception to the First Amendment to accommodate private control of information. Cf. Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that newspaper can publish identity of rape
victim that is a matter of public record); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415
(1971) (holding protected the distribution of leaflets to a realtor's neighbors describing the realtor's
"blockbusting" tactics). Second, a Court ready to carve out such an exception would begin with infor-
mation concerning citizens' intimate activities and bodily functions, not with information about citi-
zens' general purchasing decisions in a public store. Third, a decision to join a boycott to influence
social or economic decisionmaing can affect the organization of society and should be viewed as
public for purposes of First Amendment protection, regardless of the subjective perceptions of some of
the decisionmakers.
Of course, neither the Claiborne Hardware decision nor full protection of the right to boycott
should restrict the state's power to protect boycott violators from coercive actions by boycott support-
ers. The state cannot effectively prevent disapproving gazes and social ostracism. It can, however, both
regulate abusive language, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), and prohibit
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speech incident to a boycott more than they would protect the same speech
outside a boycott. " '
5. The Right Should Include a Right To Engage in Associated
Peaceful Picketing
The previously discussed principle implies its converse: Courts should
give no less protection to speech because it is used to advance a protected
boycott. Clearly, speech that is otherwise protected should not be restricted
because it advocates exercise of another political right. This converse prin-
ciple mandates full protection for picketing on public property to urge
participation in a protected consumer boycott." In the first place, boycott
organizers have no alternative means of communication, such as newspa-
per or radio advertising, that are as cost-effective as peaceful picketing in
front of a business." 5 The best time to communicate with potential con-
sumers is when a possible purchase is imminent.1 6 Although boycott or-
ganizers could communicate through leaflets without actually patrolling a
business site, off-site handbilling is more easily ignored and picketing may
have a symbolic persuasiveness for some consumers that handbilling
lacks.1
11
such punishments as fines and expulsion from an association.
113. A consumer right to boycott also obviously need not encompass any disruptive consumer
conduct, albeit expressive, which entails more than the decision not to purchase. See Ford v. Boeger,
236 F. Supp. 831 (E.D. Mo. 1964) (sit-in), aff'd, 362 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 914 (1967); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Washington Chapter of CORE, 210 F. Supp. 418
(D.D.C. 1962) (defacing billing stubs to be returned with utility bills).
114. Picketing or handbilling on private property is normally not protected by the First Amend-
ment from state trespass laws. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972).
115. An attempt to justify a restriction on speech by citing alternatives must consider their relative
cost, as well as their relative effectiveness. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93
(1977). This is especially true when the inhibited means of communication is commonly used more by
the poor than the rich. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). The admonition of
Professor Kalven should be heeded: "We would do well to avoid. . . new epigrams about the majes-
tic equality of the law prohibiting the rich man, too, from distributing leaflets or picketing." Kalven,
supra note 22, at 1, 30.
In any event, restricting communications on public streets and ways, unlike restricting communica-
tions on private property, should not be justified easily against a First Amendment challenge by the
availablity of alternative means of communication, because public streets and ways traditionally have
been considered among the most important of our public forums. See United States v. Grace, 103 S.
Ct. 1702, 1706-07 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980); Police Dep't. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). See generally Kalven, supra note
22, at 30 (arguing that expression on public streets must be given special protection in an open
society).
116. Not only are potential consumers more interested in information relevant to a purchasing
decision when the decision is imminent, but potential purchasers are also more easily identifiable by
those who would attempt to persuade them immediately prior to the purchasing decision. See Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding NLRB finding that
employer violated NLRA by preventing picketing in a 46th floor foyer immediately in front of a
struck restaurant).
117. Justice Frankfurter drew inappropriate conclusions about the emotive content of pickets, see
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Neither the implicit coerciveness of picketing nor its appeal to emotion
is a persuasive ground for denying peaceful picketing the full protection of
the First Amendment. Some Justices have suggested that the state can
restrict picketing that urges participation in a boycott because such picket-
ing coerces its intended audience.11 ' When there are many picketers on
the line, many consumers may find picketing implicitly threatening, but
peaceful picketing by a limited number of amiable people may not be at
all threatening. Moreover, as the Claiborne Hardware Court stressed,
since the state can control violence directly, threats perceived by the wary
in vigorous peaceful picketing should not justify restraint.1"
Of course, those who cross even peaceful, nonthreatening picket lines
may suffer disapproving looks and comments from their neighbors. Those
who reject appeals to take a political position, however, always risk social
pressures, and the Court has never restricted other political appeals be-
cause of concern about such pressures. The Claiborne Hardware Court,
for instance, expressly protected boycotters' direct efforts to persuade
others to join "through social pressure and the 'threat' of social ostra-
cism."120 Those consumers who wished to defy the Claiborne boycott had
to brave not only picket lines, but also the announcement of their defiance
at church meetings and in local newspapers. The Claiborne Hardware
Court, moreover, relied on its decision in Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe,1 21 which had protected the distribution of leaflets near the home
of a real estate broker to elicit the support of his neighbors against his
"blockbusting" practices.1 22 Beyond the punishments approved in Clai-
borne Hardware, the state might wish to restrict boycott organizers from
imposing certain sanctions, such as fines or expulsion from organizational
membership, on boycott violators, but it should not proscribe peaceful con-
sumer pickets because of a concern for the psychological coercion of poten-
tial consumers.123
infra pp. 441-42, but he was correct that the "loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by picket
lines" may be "unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word." Hughes v. Superior Court, 339
U.S. 460, 465 (1950).
118. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1980)
(Safeco) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769,
776-77 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring).
119. Although the Claiborne Hardware picketers were "often small children," 102 S. Ct. at 3420,
the Court could not describe the picketers as especially passive, given the participation of the adult
male "Black Hats" or "Deacons" who stood outside stores recording the names of boycott violators.
Id. at 3421.
120. 102 S. Ct. at 3424. For a full quotation, see supra note 112.
121. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
122. Id. at 416.
123. The potential abuse of associational power should be dealt with directly when abuse occurs,
and not by preventing the association from engaging in legal conduct to which individuals can claim a
right. Cf NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (right to engage in political litigation available
to NAACP as an association).
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Some Justices have also argued that picketing is not mere speech be-
cause it appeals to emotional commitments or loyalties rather than rea-
son.12 This rationale is similarly unpersuasive. The Court has held re-
peatedly that the First Amendment protects even symbolic speech
containing no substantive message and appealing only to those with pre-
formed opinions. The Court has protected the displaying of a red flag "as
a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government" 125 and
the wearing of black armbands to symbolize opposition to the Vietnam
War.126 A decade ago in Cohen v. California, the Court vacated the con-
viction of a young man for wearing the slogan "Fuck the Draft" on his
jacket in a public corridor of a courthouse. 2 Justice Harlan's majority
opinion in Cohen explained that the Court "cannot sanction the view that
the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically
speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message
sought to be communicated."
1 28
6. The Right Should Not Be Limited Because of Incidental Harmful
Effects on Non-Targeted Parties
Two additional possible limits must be rejected. First, as long as boycott
organizers intend to affect only those parties, whether public or private,
from whom they seek social change, the right should not be restricted be-
cause of the possibility of incidental harmful effects on apparently neutral
parties.
12 9
Of course, some consumer boycotts inevitably harm innocent parties.
For instance, the boycott that the National Organization for Women
(NOW) organized against political convention sites in states that had not
ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) probably directly injured
some proprietors of hotels, restaurants, and other tourist services, as well
as some employees, who were active supporters of the ERA. 30 The Clai-
124. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 618-19 (1980)
(Safeco) (Stevens, J., concurring); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 93
(1964) (Tree Fruits) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J.). See infra pp. 441-42.
125. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
126. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
127. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
128. Id. at 26; see also'Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (per curiam) (protecting
as a "form of symbolism" and "a short cut from mind to mind" the display of an American flag
upside down with an attached peace symbol).
129. Some commentators have asserted that such impact should justify restrictions on political
boycotts. See Note, Constitutional Rights of Noncommercial Boycotters: A Delicate Balance, 10 HoF-
STMA L. REv. 773 (1982); Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, supra note 16, at
986-87.
130. See Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301, 1317 (8th Cir.) (holding NOW boycott protected
Vol. 93: 409, 1984
Consumer Boycotts
borne County boycotters also may have injured some innocent employees
and suppliers along with the white businessmen whom the boycotters had
targeted.
Taking the right to boycott seriously, however, requires protecting it
against claims of incidental injury to interests without comparable consti-
tutional protection.131 It is beyond dispute that no constitutional right gen-
erally protects producers from shifts in consumer preferences, and it
would be inconsistent to protect producers from boycotts that cause such
shifts. When a business constructs a new hotel in a particular neighbor-
hood, the business runs a risk that factors beyond the hotel's control will
someday make the neighborhood less attractive. The risk that a political
controversy not of the hotel's making will result in a boycott against the
state is similar. The state may wish to insure hotels and other businesses
against such risk or to compensate them for unforeseeable developments,
but the state should not have the authority to restrict consumers' rights to
refuse to patronize because of the incidental effects of such refusals.
7. The Right Should Extend to Self-Interested Consumer Boycotters
The other important limit on the right that must be rejected is one that
would deny protection to those boycotts motivated by the self-interest of
the boycott leaders rather than by idealism or altruism. The Claiborne
Hardware opinion stresses the boycotters' desire to vindicate rights of
equality and of freedom. 3 Although this might suggest a distinction be-
tween boycotts that advance political ideals and those that advance the
boycotters' self-interest, such a distinction would be difficult to apply be-
cause acts of self-interest are not easily separated from acts of ideological
commitment. Moreover, even if manageable, the distinction would be in-
consistent with settled First Amendment jurisprudence and with the deri-
vation of the right to boycott advocated above." 3' The Court has consist-
from state tort law claim because "right to petition is of such importance that it is not an improper
interference even when exercised by way of a boycott"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). The NOW
decision provoked much commentary. See, e.g., Cockerill, Application of Noerr-Pennington and the
First Amendment to Politically Motivated Economic Boycotts: Missouri v. NOW, 13 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 85 (1979); Note, Concerted Refusals to Deal by Non-Business Groups: A Critique of Missouri v.
NOW, 49 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 143 (1980); Note, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, supra
note 16.
131. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191-92 (1977).
132. Claiborne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3426.
133. The Court has held that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment but should
not necessarily be given protection equal to that of other forms of speech. See Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (permitting state restriction of attorneys' in-person solicitation of
clients); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976). But this doctrine distinguishes a type of speech-speech advocating the sale of a product be-
cause of its merits-not the motivation of the speaker. The Court could develop a complementary
commercial doctrine to more readily approve restrictions on speech that advocates consumer boycotts
of one product because of the commercial superiority of another product. If the Court is willing to
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ently accorded political acts motivated by economic self-interest as much




III. THE CONSUMER'S RIGHT To BOYCOTT AND LABOR LAW
This section applies the right to boycott developed above to consumer
boycotts organized by labor unions to advance the economic interests of
their members. The section explores the regulation by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA, or Act) of two types of union-organized consumer
boycotts: those with a "secondary" objective and those with a "recogni-
tional" or "organizational" objective. The section suggests that this regu-
lation inappropriately infringes on the consumer's right to participate in
concerted refusals to purchase.
A. The Right Should Apply to Consumer Boycotts and Associated
Picketing Designed To Affect Labor Relations Policies
Consumer boycotts and associated picketing that are related to labor
relations deserve no less protection than other political boycotts and pick-
eting. In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley 35 and Carey v.
Brown,1" 6 the Court held that the equal protection clause prevents the
state from defining "permissible picketing in terms of its subject mat-
ter" s  when the state favors labor picketing over picketing that conveyed
other messages. A state's efforts to disfavor labor picketing because of its
content should meet with the same result. Communications concerning an
employer's policies regarding labor unions or industrial relations deserve
as much protection as communications concerning an employer's stand on
civil rights or other political matters."" The resolution of labor controver-
sies may affect as many people and be as important to the organization of
define businesses' commercial decisions as socially unimportant, such a doctrine might be viewed as
consistent with a right to boycott to influence social decisionmaking. See generally Hersbergen, Picket-
ing By Aggrieved Consumers-A Case Law Analysis, 59 IOWA L. REv. 1097 (1974) (discussing cases
dealing with boycotts and picketing motivated by dissatisfaction with products or commercial prac-
tices). No commercial speech exception, however, should permit greater restrictions on the advocacy of
a consumer boycott based on the identity or motivation of the organizers.
134. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 138
(1961) (Noerr). But see Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L.
Rav. 1 (1976) (arguing that when speech is primarily motivated by search for profits, it does not
express values of individuals or groups engaged in advocacy, and its regulation therefore does not
trench upon First Amendment values).
135. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
136. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
137. Id. at 462 (quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95).
138. "And the Constitution protects the associational rights of the members of the union precisely
as it does those of the NAACP." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
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our society as the outcomes of general elections.1 39 In any event, it is too
late to argue that legislatures should be able to draw content-based dis-
tinctions between speech concerning labor matters and other speech con-
cerning the structure of our society. For the past four decades, the Court
has recognized that "the dissemination of information concerning the facts
of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion
that is guaranteed by the Constitution . . . Free discussion concerning
the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes [is] indispensa-
ble . . ,,14o Speech by laborers and employers concerning industrial re-
lations is not simply commercial speech regarding the sale of goods; it is
speech about how we should order an aspect of society.
14 1
Any assumption that Congress can regulate publicity concerning labor
disputes as part of its policy of balancing the relative power of labor and
management would also neglect First Amendment jurisprudence. The
Court has recognized that First Amendment values would be sacrificed if
it permitted states to restrict speech because the speech might be too effec-
tive and therefore might make the speakers too influential or powerful.
1 4 2
Indeed, in decisions like Buckley v. Valeo, 1" the Court has disapproved
legislative restrictions on protected speech even though those restrictions
were designed to ensure that other protected activity not be drowned out
or stifled.
14 '
One might argue that Congress should be able to restrict union speech
because it has strengthened union power by establishing a comprehensive
139. See Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech. Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine
of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938, 954-57 (1982).
140. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
102-03 (1940)); see also NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941) (indicating
that the First Amendment also protects employer speech to employees concerning unions); Senn v.
Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937) ("Members of a union might, without special
statutory authorization by a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.").
141. See Note, supra note 139, at 958. But see A. Cox, FREEDOm OF EXPRESSION 47-48 (1981).
In Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1690 (1983), the Court held that a state may discipline its
employees for speech concerning the employees' working conditions, though not for speech concerning
"a matter of public concern." The Court made clear, however, that its holding did not lessen First
Amendment protection for speech concerning labor matters, but only insured that public employers
could have disciplinary control over public employees comparable to their private sector counterparts.
Id.
142. Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942) (Douglas, J., con-
curring) (arguing that to permit restrictions on picketing because it is effective would directly contra-
dict First Amendment values); cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505 (1981)
("A State may not completely suppress the dissemination of truthful information about an entirely
lawful activity merely because it is fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its
recipients.").
143. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
144. Id. at 48-49 (1976); accord First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.30 (1978); cf.
CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (refusing to compel FCC to require broadcast
licensees to sell editorial time).
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scheme for regulating relations between labor and management. In Buck-
ley v. Valeo, for example, the Court did not question federal limitations
on the campaign expenditures of those presidential candidates who accept
public financing.14 Yet, even if campaign finance laws provide exceptions
to the general proposition that the state cannot demand the sacrifice of
political rights as compensation for regulatory benefits,1 46 federal labor
law should not provide a further exception. A presidential candidate's ac-
ceptance of public funding is voluntary and thus quite distinct from a
union's mandatory involvement in the federal labor-management regula-
tory scheme. Furthermore, the expenditure of public money is a direct
substitute for that expenditure of private funds which the election laws
limit, while the benefits that the federal labor laws accord labor unions
are not direct substitutes for union political actions such as organizing
consumer boycotts.14
Finally, one might argue that labor picketing is "conduct" rather than
"expression," and therefore labor picketing associated with consumer boy-
cotts deserves reduced protection. In an important labor decision decided
just two Terms before Claiborne Hardware, NLRB v. Retail Store Em-
ployees Union Local 1001 (Safeco),1 48 Justice Stevens argued in a concur-
rence that "picketing is a mixture of conduct and communication" and
that in "the labor context, it is the conduct element rather than the partic-
ular idea being expressed that often provides the most persuasive deterrent
to third persons about to enter a business establishment. 1 149 Justice Ste-
vens asserted that picketing, unlike "handbills containing the same mes-
sage," calls for "an automatic response to a signal rather than a reasoned
response to an idea."
150
In light of Justice Stevens' view of labor picketing in Safeco, one won-
ders why in Claiborne Hardware he denied Mississippi's authority to
protect its citizens from potential violence and its businesses from eco-
nomic disruption. Many consumers loyal to the labor movement may ob-
145. 424 U.S. at 88-89, 108. These particular limitations, however, do not seem to have been
challenged in the case. See id.
146. See Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972) (state may not terminate public employment benefits because of employee's protected First
Amendment activity).
147. The consumer boycott organizational efforts of union members should not be more vulnera-
ble to regulation because they are motivated by these members' self-interest. Civil rights boycott or-
ganizers such as those in Claiborne County may also be motivated by self-interest. As explained
above, see supra p. 439, the motivation of boycott organizers and participants should be irrelevant to a
boycott's protection. See also Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amendment, 82 COLum.
L. REv. 1469, 1486 (1982) (decision to boycott is always made for political reasons whatever the
economic motives).
148. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
149. Id. at 619.
150. Id.
440
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serve union pickets without any reasoned analysis of the justice of the
cause of the particular pickets; the automatic loyalty of many consumers
to the civil rights movement is no less. It seems unlikely that Claiborne
County consumers gave a more "reasoned response to an idea" expressed
by the pickets than labor-sympathetic consumers would to union pickets.
More importantly, the Court has often held that symbolic speech that ap-
peals only to pre-formed opinions deserves full protection.""
Justice Stevens assumed that the Court can offer less First Amendment
protection to labor pickets likely to appeal to emotional commitments and
loyalties than it offers to similar speech by others. The assumption dates
back forty years to Justice Douglas' often quoted characterization of labor
picketing as "more than. . speech." '  It reflects the Court's continuing
confusion over when regulation of labor picketing is appropriate. Profes-
sor Cox attempted to clarify the issue by contrasting picketing that "ap-
peals only to reason, loyalty and other emotions" with "picketing backed
by the threat of [concerted refusals to work by union employees]." 15 Cox
argued that the former ("publicity" picketing) involved publicizing a labor
dispute to potential consumers and that the latter ("signal" picketing) typ-
ically served as a signal of an agreement to strike by union employees,
characteristically backed by the threat of union discipline or ostracism. 1"
Cox's distinction, however, does not justify Justice Frankfurter's opinion
in Hughes,'" which extended to consumer picketing the presumption that
picketing is more than speech."' Justice Stevens in Safeco similarly
151. See supra p. 438. Justice Stevens made no serious effort to square his Claiborne Hardware
opinion with his Safeco opinion. However, he did make a perfunctory reference to Safeco in Claiborne
Hardware. 102 S. Ct. at 3425-26. A recent Note, supra note 139, cites this reference as establishing
an illusory distinction between "public issue" picketing and labor picketing which permits the states
to restrict the latter more easily than the former. Id. at 947-49. Fortunately for the development of
our law, such specious distinctions cannot always withstand the force of a new and cogent legal prin-
ciple, even when the principle is pronounced in a case that purportedly clings to the distinction.
152. "Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a
particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or
another quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated." Bakery & Pastry
Drivers Local 802 v. WohI, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring). Picketing, of
course, does include conduct as well as communication, and, like all conduct, see supra p. 414, it
sometimes can be regulated for such legitimate reasons as preventing physical coercion, see supra p.
436. This does not justify regulation based on the content of the communication, however. See NLRB
v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 76-79 (1964) (Tree Fruits) (Black, J., concur-
ring). For reasons stated in the text, this is true even when the communication is symbolic.
153. Cox, supra note 84, at 594 (emphasis added). Professor Cox's analysis drew on Justice
Traynor's dissent in Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 867, 198 P.2d 885, 895 (1948)
(Traynor, J., dissenting), aff'd, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). See Cox, The Influence of Mr. Justice Murphy
on Labor Law, 48 MicH. L. REv. 767, 788-89 (1950) (drawing same contrast); see also Fruit &
Vegetable Packers Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (citing Cox), vacated,
377 U.S. 58 (1964); T. EMESON, supra note 22, at 445 (distinguishing "expression" from "economic
coercion").
154. Cox, supra note 84, at 595.
155. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
156. Id. at 465. Justice Douglas came to regret Justice Frankfurter's use of his Wohl rhetoric. See
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twisted Cox's distinction by suggesting that picketing which "signals" pre-
formed emotions and loyalties should be distinguished from picketing call-
ing for a reasoned response to an idea, regardless of whether the audience
consists of employees or consumers, and regardless of the likelihood of the
audience's having any prearranged agreement to respond.
157
On this point, however, Justice Stevens' opinion in Claiborne Hard-
ware might instruct more successfully than did Cox's article. As discussed
above,1 8 Justice Stevens' distinction of Hughes rested on the assumed ille-
gality of the goal of the Hughes boycotters, not on any suggestion that
their pickets were more apt to "signal" loyalties or emotions than were
the Claiborne Hardware pickets.1 9 The distinction Professor Cox drew
between pickets aimed at employees and those aimed at consumers should
turn not on the different natures of the appeals to the two types of audi-
ences, but rather on the state's greater authority to restrict employee boy-
cotts than to control consumer boycotts. This is a simple application of the
first definitional principle developed above, which recognizes the state's
need to regulate citizens in their specialized economic roles as
producers.16°
B. Secondary Consumer Boycotts and the NLRA
An examination of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA readily high-
lights the sharp contrast between the right to boycott suggested by
Claiborne Hardware and the doctrines that both Congress and the
Supreme Court have developed to govern consumer boycotts organized by
labor unions. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibits labor unions from coercing
one business to cease dealing with another business; "coercion" encom-
passes any means beyond limited non-picketing publicity. 1 1  In
Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 295-97 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice
Frankfurter's willingness to permit restrictions on peaceful picketing because its communicative con-
tent could not be considered part of an abstract intellectual dialogue to achieve truth possibly reflected
his self-conception as a defender of high reason against passion. See H. HnZsCH, THE ENIGMA OF
FEux FRANKFURTER 41, 66 (1981).
157. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619.
158. See supra p. 432.
159. Claiborne Hardware, 102 S. Ct. at 3427 n.49.
160. See supra p. 429. If the state's authority is exercised to declare illegal some type of unreason-
ably disruptive work stoppages, then any type of communication to spark such a work stoppage, no
matter how reasoned and in what form, should be prohibited.
161. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce,
where in either case an object thereof is. . .forcing or requiring any person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . ...
A proviso to § 8(b)(4) protects certain union boycott-organizing tactics by exempting from all of the
section's proscriptions "publicity. . .for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including con-
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Safeco,162 the Supreme Court held that this section makes certain union-
organized consumer boycotts unlawful.16s
There, the Retail Store Employees Union encouraged consumers not to
purchase Safeco's title insurance at five independent title companies. The
Court had previously held in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local
760 (Tree Fruits) that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) did not proscribe boycotts of
products rather than of entire businesses."" The Safeco Court retreated
from Tree Fruits by holding that picketing would be illegal if designed to
induce a product boycott that is also likely "to induce customers not to
patronize" a neutral business and to threaten that neutral business with
"substantial loss."" 5 Since the union's dispute was only with Safeco's la-
bor policies and since the independent title companies derived almost all of
their income from sales of Safeco's insurance,""6 the Court declared the
union's picketing of the five companies unlawful.
To understand how the interpretation given section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) in
Safeco infringes on the consumer right to boycott developed here, one must
recall two of the definitional principles elaborated above. First, the state
can declare certain producer boycotts illegal, such as those of one business
by another business; and second, the state can outlaw consumer boycotts
designed to compel an independently illegal act. Under these principles,
the state should be able to proscribe only union-organized consumer boy-
cotts that attempt to utilize special economic power of producers that the
producers themselves may not legally use in a boycott.
The Safeco Court's interpretation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), however,
permits more intrusive state action. In the first place, no laws make illegal
the goal of the Safeco picketers-a decision by each of the five local title
companies to cease doing business with Safeco. Any or all of the five com-
panies could have decided, because of the loss of business caused by the
Safeco boycott, to go out of business or to transfer their business to an-
sumers and members of a labor organization that a product or products are produced by an employer
with whom the labor organization has the primary dispute and are distributed by another employer
.... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). This proviso, however, expressly denies protection both to
union efforts to inform customers through picketing and to any union publicity, including handbilling
or newspaper publications, which have an ancillary effect of inducing any employee of the distributing
employer to refuse to perform any services. Id. Furthermore, the proviso does not protect certain other
peaceful boycott techniques, including some employed by the Claiborne County boycotters, such as
publishing the names of boycott violators and threatening social pressure and ostracism.
162. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
163. Although the Safeco Court dealt with a congressional restriction on picketing, while the Clai-
borne Hardware Court dealt with a state restriction, there is no reason to think the federal-state
distinction should make a difference.
164. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
165. 447 U.S. at 614, 615 n.11.
166. In fact, the five title companies were only formally independent of Safeco. Safeco owned
substantial stock in each, and the Board of Directors of each included at least one Safeco officer. Id at
609.
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other underwriter without fear of any legal action. This is significant be-
cause no peaceful and otherwise legal consumer boycott of a supposedly
neutral seller of goods should be made illegal unless the seller could not
legally comply with the boycotters' demands. To prevent consumers from
attempting to influence lawful decisions of sellers would obstruct the goal
of equalizing the potential influence of all citizens on important decision-
making in our society. Thus, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) should not restrict or-
dinary consumers from using their limited buying power to try to affect
the employment relations of society unless businesses are also restricted
from using their special economic power.'6 7
Congress, of course, could eliminate this aspect of the Act's infringe-
ment of consumer power by proscribing labor-related business boycotts of
other businesses." 8  Even were it to do so,"' however, section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) as interpreted in Safeco would infringe inappropriately on
the right to boycott. The Safeco boycotters in fact were not attempting to
augment their protected consumer economic power with the special eco-
nomic power of the five title companies. The Safeco boycott was directed
at the products of Safeco-not the products sold by the five local compa-
nies. The boycott's economic impact thus came totally from the aggregate
impact of individual consumers' decisions not to use Safeco's underwriting
services. The effect would have been the same if the individual consumers'
decisions not to patronize Safeco's product were based on the intrinsic
quality of the product, rather than on the the labor policies of the pro-
ducer. Under these circumstances, any of the five companies that ceased
doing business with Safeco would have done so because of declining sales
167. Justice Powell, writing for three other Justices, dismissed the constitutional issue in Safeco in
one paragraph. Powell claimed that the union's picketing could be declared illegal because it coerced
"a neutral party to join the fray" and therefore had "unlawful objectives." Id. at 616. Powell did not
explain, however, why the "neutral" local businesses would have been acting illegally had they joined
"the fray." Perhaps Powell intended to characterize the injury to the local companies, rather than the
companies' participation in the campaign, as the "unlawful objective" of the boycotters. However, the
boycotters' objective was not to injure the local businesses, and incidental injury to these businesses
should not have justified restraint of the boycotters' constitutional rights. See supra p. 439. Powell
relied on Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951), which upheld the constitutionality of §
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), but in a case dealing with employee boycotts rather than consumer boycotts.
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion on the First Amendment issue in Safeco, 447 U.S. at 618-19, is
discussed supra p. 442. Justice Blackmun also wrote a separate concurring opinion on the constitu-
tional issue. See 447 U.S. at 616-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
168. For example, Congress has prohibited "hot cargo clauses," or voluntary employer-union
agreements not to deal with other employers engaged in a labor dispute, in order to close a perceived
loophole in the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
169. However, even a proscription of business boycot4 would not restrict a parent company's
right to control its subsidiaries. Therefore, Congress should not prohibit a consumer boycott of any of
the businesses of a parent company because of the labor policies of any other company which the
parent has the right to control. But see Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that
the publicity proviso does not protect distribution of leaflets to consumers of products of parent com-
pany because of strike at subsidiary).
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of Safeco's insurance, not because the boycotters threatened to boycott the
title company's other products.170
Full protection of the right to boycott suggested by Claiborne Hard-
ware requires strict adherence to the reading given section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
by the Supreme Court in Tree Fruits: The section does not cover "con-
sumer picketing employed only to persuade customers not to buy the
struck product" where "the secondary employer's purchases from the
struck firms are decreased only because the public has diminished its
purchase of the struck product."' ' The Safeco decision, however, eroded
the Tree Fruit's refinement of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by approving both the
"primary" or "single product" and the "merged product" exceptions.1 2
The "single product" exception permits restricting the boycotting of any
business, like a gasoline refinery,173 a restaurant franchisor, 74 or perhaps
a housing builder,17 5 that sells its product through independent sellers de-
pendent on the sales of one or a few products. Any effective picketing of
such independent sellers, of course, will threaten them with the "ruin or
substantial loss" that Safrco held justifies application of the section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) restrictions.
The merged product doctrine permits application of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to boycotted products sold to consumers only as part of the
sale of the "neutral" seller's other products. For instance, the doctrine
invalidated picketing a bank because of the labor policies of the company
providing it with janitorial services,176 picketing intended to spark a con-
sumer boycott of products whose advertising supported a radio or televi-
sion station or newspaper with objectionable labor policies,1 77 and picket-
170, Of course, any seller who cannot replace the boycotted product with another product and
maintain its pre-boycott profit levels will have good reason to press the targeted business to respond to
the boycotters' demands. See Note, Consumer Picketing and the Single-Product Secondary Employer,
47 U. CHI. L. REv. 112, 128-29 (1979). However, similar commercially motivated pleas to suppliers
from sellers can be expected whenever sellers perceive shifts in consumer demand. Such pleas only
express the market power of consumers over the boycotted products; they are not threats by businesses
attempting to add their special market power to that of consumers.
171. 377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964). "On the other hand, when consumer picketing is employed to per-
suade customers not to trade at all with the secondary employer, the latter stops buying the struck
product, not because of a falling demand, but in response to pressure designed to inflict injury on his
business generally." Id.
172. 447 U.S. at 612-13 & n.7.
173. See Local 14,055, United Steelworkers, 211 N.L.R.B. 649, 651-52 (1974) (consumer picket-
ing of gas stations directed against gas refiners held illegal), enforcement denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), complaint dismissed, 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977).
174. See Bennett v. Local 456, Teamsters, 459 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (consumer picket-
ing of franchised ice cream store directed against franchisor held illegal).
175. See Hoffman v. Cement Masons Union Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972) (consumer
picketing of real estate office directed against housing general contractor held unprotected), cerL de-
nied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
176. NLRB v. Building Serv. Employees Int'l Union Local No. 103, 367 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.
1966).
177. Honolulu Typographical Union v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1968); Roywood Corp. v.
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ing designed to discourage the purchase of a targeted bakery's bread that
was served as a free side dish by the restaurant the pickets patrolled.178 In
such instances, 17 1 a consumer's decision not to purchase the boycotted
product would necessarily require the consumer also to reject other prod-
ucts sold by the "neutral" business as a package with the boycotted prod-
uct. The only way for a consumer not to subsidize a bank's janitorial
services would be to refuse to purchase any of the bank's services; the only
way for a consumer to reject a broadcaster's product is to reject the goods
which are advertised on the station;180 and the only way for a consumer
not to purchase bread served without charge by a restaurant is not to
purchase the meal that accompanies the bread. 8"
Given the potential effectiveness of publicity picketing, both doctrines
affirmed by Safeco significantly inhibit the right of union organizers to
communicate effectively with possible consumer boycott participants.18
Furthermore, the state cannot argue that eliminating incidental harm to
neutral parties justifies inhibiting the communications of boycott or-
ganizers. As the sixth definitional principle stressed, if we take seriously
the right to boycott and the right to publicize the boycott, sellers' interests
in maintaining high sales that are not themselves protected as rights can-
Radio Broadcast Technicians Local Union No. 1264, 290 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. Ala. 1968).
178. American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969).
179. See also Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1980) (application of merged product
doctrine to store's use of shopping bags produced by the primary boycott target); Maxey v. Butcher's
Union Local No. 126, 627 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980) (application of doctrine to restaurant's sale of
meat processed by the primary boycott target); K & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 1228 (3d Cir.
1979) (application of doctrine to housing developer's use of targeted carpentry sub-contractor's work).
180. A newspaper could be boycotted directly by a concerted refusal to purchase. When a large
proportion of a newspaper's revenues is derived from the sale of advertisements, however, a con-
sumer's withdrawal of support for the newspaper would not be completely effective without a refusal
to purchase the advertised products as well.
181. Actually, the pickets in the American Bread case only requested restaurant patrons not to
order or eat the bread served with the restaurant's meals. 411 F.2d at 154. However, prospective
patrons who wished both to respect the pickets and also to eat bread with their meals would have been
obliged to take their business elsewhere.
182. As possible recipients of information about a boycott, potential consumers have a protected
First Amendment interest in the boycott organizers' freedom to communicate effectively. See Virginia
Citizens Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (First
Amendment can be asserted by consumers who have an interest in receiving information about a
product). Moreover, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is directed only at pickets with a particular message, and the
Court has "consistently rejected the suggestion that a government may justify a content-based prohibi-
tion by showing that speakers have alternative means of expression." Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 n.10 (1980).
The publicity proviso to § 8(b)(4), see supra note 161, protects at least most handbilling that the
single and merged product doctrines would otherwise restrain. See Great Western Broadcasting Corp.
v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1966) (interpreting publicity proviso broadly to cover boycotters'
publicity against the products advertised by broadcasting station in labor dispute), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 1002 (1966). But see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983) (outlining
use of merged product doctrine to limit proviso's protection of handbilling). In any event, picketing
may have a special persuasive force for some consumers. See supra p. 436.
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not override the boycott right.1 83 There is no right to continued sales that
trumps political rights to refuse to purchase.'"
The NLRB, and many courts, have refused to find picketing protected
under the Tree Fruits struck-product exception to section (8)(b)(4)(ii)(B)
when the picketers failed to identify dearly the struck product they did
not wish consumers to buy or the targeted employer who produced this
product.1 8 5 If the Act outlawed a business's participation in a labor boy-
cott against another business, this clear identification requirement would
be a reasonable means to ensure that unions do not urge consumers to
increase their market votes by coercing a "neutral" business to join their
boycott. Assuming the law makes a union's responsibilities clear, the
Board and the courts could infer that a union intends to incite a general
boycott of a retail establishment by displaying placards or handbills""'
that do not clearly identify both the primary target and the means by
which sympathetic consumers can use their market votes directly against
the target.
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183. See supra p. 439. The NOW boycott of convention sites in states that failed to ratify the
ERA probably should be considered a merged product boycott. See Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). The only way that the NOW convention planners could
register economic votes against businessmen who had not supported ERA passage was to refuse to
bring any convention business to the state.
184. This analysis also supports the protection of boycotts organized by groups who are morally
offended by the content of certain television programs against the products whose advertising supports
these programs. Whether a consumer dislikes the labor policies of a producer of a television program
or the social content of the program, the consumer can refuse to support the program by refusing to
purchase the products that support it. Moreover, since advertising differentiates commercial products,
the program sponsoring an advertisement becomes inextricably tied to the product.
185. See Kaynard v. Independent Routemen's Ass'n, 479 F.2d 1070, 1073 (2d Cir. 1973); NLRB
v. Local 254, Bldg. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 359 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1966); Anderson v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local No. 712, 422 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Local 248,
Meat & Allied Food Workers, 230 N.L.R.B. 189, 189 & n.2 (1977).
186. The proviso to § 8(b)(4) protects "publicity, other than picketing," but only when it "truth-
fully" advises "that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organi-
zation has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
Courts therefore might prohibit handbilling which did not "truthfully" and adequately identify the
precise employer with whom the union had a primary dispute.
The proviso also seems not to protect non-picketing publicity that attacks the "neutral" secondary
employer directly in addition to identifying the primary employer disputant. See Service Employees
Local 399, 263 N.L.R.B. 996 (1982). This limitation on the reach of the proviso also is an appropri-
ate restriction on boycotts designed to enlist the special economic leverage of some employers against
other employers. For instance, in the Service Employees case, the picketers were attempting to per-
suade consumers to express not only their rejection of a non-union janitorial service, but also their
distrust of the safety of Delta Airlines' transportation services. Id. at 996-98. Thi picketers thereby
attempted to utilize Delta's economic power against a non-union janitorial service.
187. See Note, Secondary Consumer Picketing, Statutory Interpretation and the First Amend-
inent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1842-43 (1983). Restricting boycotters for not clearly identifying
targeted products would not require acceptance of any particular level of state power to restrict boy-
cott communications that misrepresent reality. See supra note 111; United Farm Workers v. Babbitt,
449 F. Supp. 449, 462 (D. Ariz. 1978) (holding Arizona labor act unconstitutional because it pro-
scribed "dishonest, untruthful, and deceptive publicity" to encourage a consumer boycott), rev'd on
other grounds, 442 U.S. 289 (1979). If business boycotts are illegal, the state should be able to require
clear identification of targeted products simply to ensure that the consumer boycotters do not supple-
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Once consumer boycotts and the labor union picketing and handbilling
to organize such boycotts are protected as rights, however, the NLRB and
courts should limit commands to unions concerning the contents of their
placards or handbills to orders with which unions can comply without
losing the power to urge consumers to boycott the primary target. The
Board and courts should not require a union to identify for consumers the
products of the targeted primary employer with a specificity that the na-
ture and distribution of the product does not permit. Otherwise, the tribu-
nals would restrict sincere union attempts to organize a consumer boycott
of targeted employers because of incidental effects that the union cannot
control.188
C. Recognitional and Organizational Consumer Boycotts
and the NLRA
Section 8(b)(7) of the NLRA, which restricts recognitional and organi-
zational picketing by labor unions, also threatens to undermine the right
to use consumer dollars to support or oppose social policies.18' This provi-
sion proscribes picketing in three situations, each governed by a separate
subsection of 8(b)(7), if such picketing is meant to force "an employer to
recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
employees" (recognitional) or to force employees "to accept or select [a]
ment their economic power with that of businesses.
188. For instance, the NLRB inappropriately found a soft drink local's picketers in violation of
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) for urging customers of a store that sold soft drinks not produced by the local to
purchase only locally manufactured soft drinks because the union placards and handbills did not
advise the consumers how they were to determine whether soft drinks were manufactured locally. Soft
Drink Workers Union Local 812, 243 N.L.R.B. 801 (1979), enforced, 657 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir.
1980). The union could not give consumers such advice because the manufacturers were not clearly
identified on the cans and bottles. In effect, by not separating the locally manufactured drinks from
the non-locally manufactured ones, the store owner had merged the struck product with other prod-
ucts. The Board could not and did not conclude that the union intended to provoke a general boycott
of the retail store which sold many items other than soft drinks. Id. The union seems to have done all
it could to focus consumers on the targeted products. For a similar case, see Bedding, Curtain &
Drapery Workers Union Local 140 v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.) (finding union violated
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by picketing to urge consumers to buy only union mattresses without identifying
which mattresses were union-made), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968). Cf United Farm Workers v.
Babbitt, 449 F. Supp. 449, 463 (D. Ariz. 1978) (declaring unconstitutional a provision of the Arizona
Farm Labor Statute prohibiting consumer pickets from referring to the trade name used by growers in
a labor dispute whenever that trade name is also used by other growers), rev'd on other grounds, 442
U.S. 289 (1979).
189. While §§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and 8(b)(7) are the most important provisions in the Act for restrict-
ing consumer boycotts, other provisions could be so used. A consumer boycott intended to force an
employer lawfully to join a labor or employer organization would apparently be proscribed by
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(A), and a consumer boycott to force an employer lawfully to resolve a work assignment
dispute would seemingly be proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(D). In addition, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(C) proscribes
many of the union recognitional consumer boycotts restricted by § 8(b)(7)(C).
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labor organization as their collective bargaining representative"
(organizational).190
The first of these subsections, section 8(b)(7)(A), restricts picketing if
the employer has already lawfully recognized another union whose status
at that time is not subject to challenge through a Board-conducted repre-
sentation election. 191 The section restricts not only appeals to employees to
strike, but also appeals to consumers to boycott. The subsection nonethe-
less appears consistent with the consumer right to boycott elaborated
above, because it proscribes forcing an employer to refuse to recognize and
bargain exclusively with an incumbent union, thereby acting illegally.'
2
The problem with section 8(b)(7)(A) arises from the distinction be-
tween organizational and recognitional picketing. However difficult to ap-
ply in practice,"' that distinction is important to the right to engage in
consumer boycotts. Some consumers, perhaps because of one union's polit-
ical activities, may decide not to shop at a store because they do not wish
to support employees who have chosen that union.' Those consumers
may wish to allocate their marketplace votes to discourage employees from
choosing that union the next time they can make a choice.195 The second
190. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976). Section 8(b)(7) was one of the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Amend-
ments to the Act. The Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1947 added a section prohibiting coercion of an
employer that is intended to force the recognition of a union when another union has been certified as
representative by the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(C) (1976). Presumably this includes any con-
sumer boycott whether or not implemented by picketing. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(C) proscribes consumer
picketing to impel an employer lawfully to transfer recognition from a certified union that has demon-
strably lost its majority support to one that has gained such support. See NLRB v. Gallaro, 419 F.2d
97 (2d Cir. 1969). The union action covered by § 8(b)(7), unlike the action covered by § 8(b)(4), is
limited simply to "picketing," but includes action with an organizational as well as recognitional
objective.
191. Section 8(b)(7)(A) proscribes recognitional or organizational picketing "where the employer
has lawfully recognized in accordance with this subchapter any other labor organization and a ques-
tion concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 159(c) of this title." 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A) (1976). Section 9(c) of the Act specifies procedures for Board-certification of
bargaining agents. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976).
192. Whenever the exclusive representational status of a lawfully recognized union cannot be
challenged, the employer's recognition of another union constitutes a refusal to bargain with the in-
cumbent union and is thus a violation of § 8(a)(5) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Under
established Board doctrine, an employer generally cannot challenge the exclusive majority status of an
incumbent union during the first three years of a valid collective bargaining agreement of a fixed
term. See General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962). Nor can an employer make such a chal-
lenge during the first yearof the incumbent union's certification. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96
(1954).
193. See Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MDNN.
L. REv. 257, 265 (1959) (calling the distinction purely verbal).
194. For instance, the United Farm Workers have apparently been able to enlist support for
consumer boycotts in their organizational battle with the Teamsters Union, at least in part because of
some public suspicion of the Teamsters.
195. Cf Dunau, Some Aspects of the Current Interpretation of Section 8(b)(7), 52 Gao. LJ. 220
(1964):
The meaning of free speech-and picketing is at least in part free speech-is that the firm and
the union may both seek customer support by appealing for it. Accordingly, if the union's
propaganda wins enough adherents among consumers, the business pinch that the firm and its
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and sixth definitional principles"9 6 protect consumer boycotts that protest
social choice rather than social status and protect the consumer's right to
boycott regardless of incidental effects on neutral parties. An organiza-
tional purpose should therefore validate any union-organized consumer
boycott and the picketing that informs it, regardless of the effects on em-
ployers who cannot legally recognize the picketing union. Congress should
not confer more protection upon employers affected by organizational
picketing than Mississippi could give to the neutral employees and suppli-
ers of the boycotted Claiborne County businesses.2
9 7
Of course, section 8(b)(7)(A), like the remainder of section 8(b)(7), is
designed to reduce any incentive an employer might have to recognize an
aggressive union against the free choice of a majority of employees. Such a
broad restriction, however, should not be justified as a preventive measure
unless the activity is both intended and likely to incite lawless action.198
Congress and the Board could offer substantial protection to an employer
caught between organizational picketing by one union and the obligation
to an incumbent union without inappropriately restricting the consumer
right to boycott. They could, for instance, impose disclosure requirements
on union picketers. Just as unions claiming protection under Tree Fruits
must make clear to consumers their reasons for picketing, a union claim-
ing to picket for an organizational rather than a recognitional purpose
should have to explain to consumers that its boycott is intended to put
pressure only on employees and that the affected employer cannot legally
transfer its recognition.1 9' Such disclosure requirements would probably
render ineffective most consumer picketing in situations now covered by
section 8(b)(7)(A). Any picketing that continues to be effective, despite the
disclosed dilemma of the employer, obviously concerns an issue that is
important to the boycotting consumers, and therefore deserves protection.
Section 8(b)(7)(B) proscribes recognitional and organizational picketing
directed at consumers as well as employee picketing "where within the
preceding twelve months [the Board has held] a valid election" for a bar-
employees may then feel may cause them to reconsider the wisdom of their nonunion prefer-
ence . . . . If the employees prefer retention of their nonunion status to alleviation of the
pinch, that too is their right, but it is just as much the right of the union to continue to
persuade the consumers to shun the nonunion product.
Id. at 234.
196. See supra pp. 431, 439.
197. See supra p. 439.
198. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); supra note 15.
199. Like a requirement that boycott organizers clearly identify the targeted products of primary
employers, see supra note 187, a requirement that organizational picketers make clear that their goal
is not to secure an employer's illegal recognition need not be justified as a regulation of misrepresenta-
tion. Such a disclosure requirement is simply a means to ensure that the picketers are organizing a
legal organizational boycott, rather than an illegal reognitional one.
450
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gaining representative. " ' This provision reflects the command of section
9(c)(3) of the Act that "[n]o election shall be directed in any bargaining
unit .. .within which in the preceeding twelve month period, a valid
election shall have been held."2"1 Congress clearly intended to insulate
employees and employers from boycott pressure to reconsider any recent
decision of the employees about bargaining representatives.
Section 8(b)(7)(B), however, conflicts more directly than section
8(b)(7)(A) with the consumer's right not to purchase goods for political or
social reasons. Consumers loyal to the labor movement may wish to with-
draw their economic support from workers who have rejected a union.
These consumers may wish to accumulate their economic votes during the
year before the employees can vote in another Board election. Moreover,
nothing in the Act prevents a majority of the employees from presenting
within the twelve-month period a statement to their employer that they
now support the union they had earlier rejected. Thus a consumer boycott
designed to provoke such a statement deserves protection. Finally, as long
as there is no incumbent bargaining representative, 202 nothing in the Act
prevents the employer from recognizing the union because of its newly
formed majority.203 Therefore, even if the union's purpose in organizing
the consumer boycott within the election year is admittedly recognitional
as well as organizational, the boycotters would not be pressuring the em-
ployer to commit an illegal act.
The last of the three subsections, 8(b)(7)(C), proscribes recognitional
and organizational picketing conducted for longer than thirty days if the
union has not filed a petition for an election.'" The subsection contains a
publicity proviso that protects informational picketing directed at consum-
ers; however, there are two limitations on its scope that potentially inter-
fere with full protection of the consumer right to boycott. Neither of these
limitations has in fact proved significant, but each illustrates the impor-
tance of reassessing labor law doctrine in light of a consumer right to
boycott.
First, the proviso protects only picketing that truthfully advises consum-
200. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1976).
201. Id. § 159(c)(3).
202. See supra p. 450.
203. In Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974), the Court upheld a
Board judgment that an employer presented with convincing evidence of a union's majority support
among its employees is under no obligation to bargain with the union until the union requests and
wins a Board-conducted election. Linden Lumber, however, does not prevent an employer from volun-
tarily recognizing a union that enjoys majority support at the time.
204. More precisely, § 8(b)(7)(C) makes illegal recognitional or organizational picketing "where
such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 159(c) of this title being filed
within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picket-
ing." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976).
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ers that the employer "does not employ members of, or have a contract
with" the union.2 5 This limitation restricts picketing by unions that wish
to publicize poor working conditions rather than the union's organiza-
tional or recognitional purposes.208 As long as the union accurately de-
scribes the employer's working conditions, this restriction is not justi-
fied. 07 Consumers may wish to boycott a business because of both its
working conditions and its employees' organizational status. As the sev-
enth definitional principle explains, consumers' ready access to informa-
tion about working conditions should not depend on the motivation of
those providing the information .
20
Second, the proviso does not protect picketing intended to advise the
public about the union status of employees if that picketing has the "ef-
fect" of inducing "any individual employed by any other person in the
course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods
or not to perform any services. "209 Although Congress could legally pro-
scribe employee boycotts, the second 8(b)(7)(C) limitation is nonetheless
troublesome. The Act now actually proscribes only the advocacy through
picketing of employee recognitional and organizational boycotts, not the
boycotts themselves. More important, although the Board and the courts
generally read this "effects" qualification restrictively to limit picketing
only when there are more than isolated delivery disruptions,210 the limita-
tion may permit restriction of a communication that has the unintended
effect of encouraging employee boycotts."' Such a restriction is inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment doctrine that the state can restrict speech
205. Id.
206. The Board has taken this restriction seriously. See, e.g., Local 275, Laborers Int'l Union,
209 N.L.R.B. 279 (1974) (regardless of recognitional objective, area standards picketing is not pro-
tected by informational proviso to § 8(b)(7)(C)); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 142 N.L.R.B.
1418 (1963) (same).
207. Cf. Solien v. Teamsters Local No. 610, 484 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (extending First
Amendment protection to picketing by non-certified union to publicize that employer, through con-
tract with another union, was not providing wages and working conditions equal to area standards).
208. Even a requirement that the organizational or recognitional picketers disclose their interest
in attacking the working conditions of an employer should be suspect. The Noerr Court also inter-
preted the Sherman Act not to prohibit corporate-funded public attacks on other corporations simply
because the attacks were presented as "being spontaneous declarations of independent groups." 365
U.S. at 140-41. This interpretation was partly based on a concern about governmental restrictions on
"unethical business conduct" leading to the erosion of First Amendment rights. Id.
209. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976).
210. See Barker Bros. Corp. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1964); Lebus v. Building &
Constr. Trades Council Local 60, 199 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. La. 1961). Many commentators have also
expressed this view. See, e.g., Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
73 HARv. L. REv. 1086, 1107 (1960); Cox, supra note 193, at 267.
211. Some judges, however, have asserted that the use of the word "induce" in the "effect" quali-
fication on the § 8(b)(7)(C) publicity proviso may demand an inquiry into whether the union intended
to persuade delivery persons to observe the pickets. See Barker Bros. Corp. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 431,
434 (9th Cir. 1964); McLeod v. Chefs, Cooks & Pastry Cooks Local 89, 280 F.2d 760, 765 (2d Cir.
1960) (Waterman, J., concurring).
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advocating political or social change only if it is "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action, 212 not simply because it may have
the effect of stimulating illegal action.213  Although the Court has sug-
gested that the state can restrict speech to avert an unintended but immi-
nent violent reaction,214 the Court has also made clear that the state has
an obligation to use where possible alternatives less restrictive than the
suppression of speech.215 Even if violence accompanied employees' illegal
observance of peaceful recognitional picket lines that were intended only
to influence consumers, the state could adequately control such observance
by proscribing the employee actions rather than by restricting the picket-
ing. The state could also require the picketing unions to inform delivery
employees that they are to ignore the picket lines.216 These measures
would adequately serve the legitimate state interest in restricting employee
boycotts without also restricting protected consumer boycotts.2 17
212. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See generally Redish, Advocacy of Unlaw-
ful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CALIF. L. REV.
1159, 1183-90 (1982). Redish argues that a speaker's intent to incite unlawful conduct should not
alone justify state restriction, id. at 1178; but he would require that the state present evidence "that a
specific crime has been advocated," id. at 1180.
213. See Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539-40 (S.D.N.Y.) ("propaganda" that
can lead indirectly "to a disintegration of loyalty and a disobedience of law" distinct from speech that
"counsels and advises resistance to existing law"), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); Gunther, Learned
Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 719 (1975). Decisions striking down state efforts to protect national security are particularly
persuasive. Presumably the state can more easily justify restrictions on speech as unintended threats to
national security than as unintentionally disrupting the economy.
214. E.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 289
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (dictum).
215. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1963).
216. At least one court that found picketing protected as informational stressed the picketing
union's efforts to inform delivery employees that the picketing was not directed at them. Henderson v.
Local 8, Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, 86 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 11,444 (W.D.
Wash. 1979). Another court that found picketing not protected by the publicity proviso stressed the
union's failure to try to minimize the impact of its picketing on employees. Hirsch v. Building &
Constr. Trades Council, 530 F.2d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 1976).
217. The second proviso to § 8(b)(4), see supra note 161, while protecting publicity other than
picketing for the purpose of advising the public that a product is produced by an employer with whom
the picketing union has a primary dispute, contains an effect-on-delivery qualification similar to that
in § 8(b)(7). Presumably because the § 8(b)(4) proviso does not apply to picketing, it has not gener-
ated much litigation. The effect-on-delivery qualification in the § 8(b)(4) proviso nonetheless raises
the same issues as the qualification in the § 8(b)(7)(C) proviso.
Courts appropriately have refused to apply the Tree Fruits doctrine, see supra pp. 445-46, to limit
the applicability of § 8(b)(4) where union picketers manifest an intent to address employees rather
than consumers. See NLRB v. Millmen & Cabinet Makers Union Local 550, 367 F.2d 953 (9th Cir.
1966); Penello v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 280 F. Supp. 643 (D. Md. 1968). The discussion in the
text suggests that this limitation on the applicability of Tree Fruits should turn on a finding of union
intent to induce employees to stop deliveries or service, and not simply on a finding of effect.
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CONCLUSION
Many readers will no doubt resist the conclusions of the last section of
this Article. Statutory restrictions on consumer boycotts incidental to labor
disputes have equitable appeal if considered in isolation; that appeal,
however, can be misleading. It is such boycotts, rather than traditional
political consumer boycotts such as the Claiborne Hardware boycott, that
generate the hard cases that have made bad law. If all groups, regardless
of the attractiveness of their cause and the conventionally perceived ade-
quacy of their social power, have an equal claim to political power, hard
cases cannot be considered in isolation. A new hard case, Claiborne Hard-
ware, may induce rethinking at a sufficiently high level of abstraction to
show that this equitable appeal vanishes before the fundamental principle
favoring improvement of democratic decisionmaking processes.
Claiborne Hardware may adequately clarify the specious appeal of the
NLRA restrictions on consumer boycotts. Yet our lawmakers may ignore
the abstract implications of the decision and limit its holding to its con-
crete facts. Such reification of hard cases is not unknown and is sometimes
desirable. Were the right affirmed by Claiborne Hardware not one our
society should secure, the case would deserve reification. The consumer
right to engage in concerted refusals to purchase, however, should not be
weakened by anomalous distinctions. It is a right consistent with the best
democratic promises of our society. Even in future hard cases, we should
accept its implications.
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